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ABSTRACT 
 
 
  Global population growth, climate change, and industrialization, are putting extreme pressures 
on worldwide freshwater supplies (Cosens 2010). Of the global freshwater supplies, 
transboundary water sources play a crucial role in sustaining populations. Over 40% of humans 
on Earth rely on a transboundary river or lake for access to water, and 90% of the world’s 
population lives in countries that share bodies of water with at least one other country (UN 
2008). Taken together, the motivations for improving governance of transboundary water 
systems have never been stronger. To meet the challenges associated with transboundary water 
governance, researchers working at multiple scales and across international, state and sub-state 
levels, have been applying the concepts of adaptive governance to analyze complex water 
contexts (Cosens 2010, Akamani and Wilson 2011, and Chaffin et al. 2016).  
  To contribute to this body of work and extend transboundary water governance literature, this 
study applies the lens of adaptive governance (AG) to an historic analysis of the environmental 
governance of the pristine and wild international Flathead River that cuts across the border 
between Canada and the United States. Proposed coal mines in the upper basin located in the 
western Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) threatened this diverse river environment 
from 1974 to 2014. Fortunately, dual mining bans passed by BC and the US in 2011 and 2014, 
respectively, removed this industrial threat from the entire basin. To better understand how these 
bans emerged this study identifies and examines four key historic events that were crucial to 
collaboration across borders and communities and to preventing coal mining. This study uses a 
conceptual framework for AG, which describes the criteria necessary for AG to emerge and the 
governance conditions that functional AG enables. This analytical framework helps to shed light 
on the extent to which AG emerged during the 40 year timespan and the ways in which the key 
events constituted adaptations. Results showed that an adaptive outcome was reached but that the 
complexities of transboundary environmental governance prevented adaptations in most 
instances. Examining the recent history of the international Flathead River advances our 
understanding of the unique sequence of events that resulted in preserving, at least for the 
present, a unique transboundary ecosystem. This understanding also contributes to the need for 
creative strategies to improve transboundary water governance outcomes globally. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Global population growth, climate change, and industrialization are putting extreme 
pressures on worldwide freshwater supplies (Cosens 2010). These trends are resulting in 
increasing demand for water, decreasing groundwater levels, and increasingly polluted water 
bodies (Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano 2003). These dangerous trends are especially relevant for the 
world’s transboundary bodies of water, which are rivers or lakes that are divided by at least one 
international border. Transboundary water sources are a crucial supply of freshwater to global 
populations; over 40% of humans on Earth rely on a transboundary river or lake for access to 
water and 90% of the world’s population lives in countries that share bodies of water with at 
least one other country (UN 2008). The combination of worldwide decreases in access to clean 
water with significant reliance on transboundary water sources means that water use in one 
country impacts the other countries sharing that resource in increasingly complex and important 
ways (Fischhendler and Feitelson 2005). This is not only true in terms of ensuring access to 
freshwater for people and industry as many of these transboundary water sources exist in basins 
that are also amongst the world’s most important corridors for the connectivity of wildlife and 
entire ecological systems (Worboys et al. 2014). The need to improve understanding and 
function of transboundary water governance systems is especially pressing given that “water is 
the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute” (Wolf 1997, 334). 
Several bodies of research have responded to this challenge. One emerging approach has 
been to look at bodies of water, specifically rivers in this case, from a novel perspective. 
Schonach (2017) shows that deconstructing river histories, in relation to human actors, can shed 
light on the evolving relationship between humans and nature. Building on this theme Schiff 
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(2017) set out to find lessons for modern transboundary water management through systematic 
historical analysis of a series of governance responses to pollution crises on Germany’s Rhine 
River. Schiff’s findings about how Rhine River stakeholders were able to navigate transboundary 
river pollution crises highlight the potential for a history of shared water governance to fuel a 
future of shared water governance, an insight born out in my study of the international Flathead 
River.  
Research Setting 
The international Flathead River emerges from its headwaters in southeastern British 
Columbia’s (BC) Clark Range. Here, underlying the headwaters, is a large portion of the East 
Kootenay coalfields (Mills et al. 2012, 2). Designated as Crown Land, this land is, for the most 
part, managed by BC administrators. From its headwaters, the river runs south for 30 miles 
through glacially carved valleys before crossing into northwestern Montana. Upon entering 
Montana, the river becomes the border between Glacier National Park and a mixture of 
occasional parcels of private land and the Flathead National Forest. After flowing for 56 miles 
south of the BC-Montana border, the river meets its confluence with the Middle Fork of the 
Flathead River. Downstream, the river enters Flathead Lake. Eventually, these waters flow into 
the Columbia River and out into the Pacific Ocean.  
The international boundary that the international Flathead River crosses between BC and 
Montana signifies more than which nation has jurisdiction over the river at one place or another. 
Crucially, the border also marks a significant cultural divide in how the river is valued, 
understood, and, even, named. In BC, the river is known simply as the Flathead River. In 
Montana, the river is known as the North Fork of the Flathead River. To recognize this 
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difference, as well as to cut down on confusion, the river is referred to exclusively as the 
international Flathead River in this study. As for the differences in valuation and understanding 
of the river, those stem from historic cultural differences in how public resources are viewed in 
each country, both broadly and locally. For instance, significant differences stem from the 
ramifications of provincial control over most public natural resources, as in BC and Canada, and 
federal control over most public natural resources, as in Montana and the US. Further, a notably 
larger population resides in the area surrounding the Montana stretch of the international 
Flathead River than in the area surrounding the BC stretch of the river. This too has had an 
impact on how the river is valued by those involved in its governance. Finally, US researchers 
have conducted a majority of the academic work on the international Flathead River. A result of 
this imbalance is that the river is more commonly referred to in the literature by its US name, the 
North Fork of the Flathead. This naming choice echoes the broader issue of US, and Montana, 
actors dictating too much of the broader conversation on the past, present, and future of the river 
and basin. The naming choice made in this study is done in an effort to begin to correct this 
imbalance and increase shared understanding and responsibility for the governance of the 
international Flathead. These themes are important to understanding the challenges associated 
with governance of this natural resource and they are explored further throughout the rest of this 
study.   
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Figure 1: Map of Relation of international Flathead River to Columbia River (Pfly, Columbia River Tributaries: 
North Fork of Flathead River, Wikipedia 2018) 
 
	
A Special Place 
	
Over the course of the international Flathead’s run from BC into Montana, the river and 
surrounding basin provide habitat for an impressive variety of aquatic and terrestrial organisms. 
A report from the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (2009, 4), notes that the international 
Flathead River watershed: 
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…provides critical habitat for 16 species of carnivores and has the highest concentration 
of grizzly bears in the interior of the N. American continent. The watershed is also the 
last intact wildlife corridor for grizzly bear, wolf and Canadian lynx along the Canada/US 
border. The river, whose water is rated among the purest in the world, provides critical 
habitat for many native salmonid species, of which the endangered bull trout and 
genetically pure westslope cutthroat trout are of great importance. 
	
The river basin’s climate and ecosystem are also critical features of the international Flathead 
River. The basin is part of the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem, which is home to alpine 
tundra, coniferous forests, prairie grasslands, and glacial lakes (May 1993). The elevation of the 
river basin is generally around 3500 feet above sea level. The climate of this area is a blend of 
coastal Pacific weather patterns and continental weather patterns (ibid.). Historically, the 
Ktunaxa and Salish peoples travelled through and inhabited this region (Thompson, Kootenai 
Culture Committee, and Pikunni Traditional Association 2015). However, European populations 
rose to dominance in the late 19th century. Their arrival marked the beginning of efforts to both 
extract natural resources from the area and, shortly after, to conserve the area through protective 
land designations (Buchholtz 1976). Glacier National Park, established in 1910, is the most 
notable example of the responsive efforts to conserve the region for future generations to 
experience. The dual narratives of resource exploitation and large-landscape conservation 
continued to define the environmental governance of this area for the rest of the 20th century and 
remain influential today. 
In 2011 and 2014, BC and the United States (US) each, respectively, passed legislation 
forever banning mining and oil and gas exploration in the international Flathead River basin. 
These pieces of legislation were the culmination of over 40 years of disagreement between 
Canada and the US over what the best uses of the land in the basin were. The ramifications of 
these land use decisions had direct ties to the status of the clean waters of the international 
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Flathead River. This disagreement specifically centered on whether to approve or reject a series 
of proposed coal mines on the BC side of the basin around the headwaters of the river. The 
stakes of this conflict were particularly high, evidenced by dramatically contrasting references to 
the conflict in one 2007 publication and two 2009 publications written about the status of the 
river. At the same time that the UNESCO World Heritage Committee report (2009, 4), cited 
above, identified the river as being a major part of “one of the most intact and biologically 
productive ecosystems in North America,” an American Rivers (2009) report identified the US 
stretch of the river as the 5th most endangered river in the US due to the threat of pollution 
resulting from potential upstream coal mining. A front page headline in the Vancouver Sun 
referred to the river as “BC’s Most Endangered River” (Pynn 2007). The contrast between these 
two statuses, pristine and polluted, exemplifies what has been at stake for those who have been 
working for decades to protect the river and broader basin from environmental degradation.  
Given the scale of the damage that would have occurred had mining proceeded, the dual 
2011 and 2014 legislative bans on mining and oil and gas exploration are excellent examples of 
the potential of transboundary water governance to protect freshwater resources through 
governmental action. Nonetheless, the remarkable amount of work that went into the 
legislation’s passage over more than four decades also demonstrates how complicated reaching 
agreements on shared water resources at the international scale can be.  
 
7 
	
  
 
Figure 2: Map of Geographic Context of the International Flathead River (FRISB, Upper Flathead River Basin, 
1987) 
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Emergence of Coal Mining Threat in the International Flathead 
	
This story begins in 1974, when news broke in Montana of a proposed coal mine in the 
BC side of the international Flathead River basin (Wilson 1984, 112). The response of Montana 
elected officials, engaged members of the public, and local scientists was swift. By 1977, the 
newly formed local river-activist and -advocacy group, the Flathead Coalition, had helped to 
motivate (then) Montana Congressman Max Baucus to secure significant funding from the 
Environmental Protection Agency for a study on the potential impacts of resource extraction on 
the river and basin ecosystem (Flathead Basin Commission 1983). The results of this study, 
published in 1983, conclusively stated that the proposed coal mine on the BC side of the basin 
would pollute downstream water and terrestrial systems (Flathead Basin Commission 1983).  
In the years following the study’s publication, momentum built to confront the continued 
threat of coal mining in a more formal manner. For many of the people and groups involved in 
this effort, the goal became convincing the US and Canadian governments to reach out to the 
International Joint Commission (IJC) to request that a referral process take place (Sax and Keiter 
1987). By 1985, there was pressure for the two governments to enter into such a referral process 
being generated by both communities in Montana and, increasingly, some local communities in 
BC (Pers. Comm. Expert #3, 2018). Given that Canada was not required to and perhaps, as the 
upstream party in this context, did not stand to gain much from such a process, their eventual 
agreement to enter into a referral process in 1985 was somewhat surprising (Thompson and 
Thomas 2007).  
In 1988, the findings from the IJC referral study established that pollution from the 
proposed coal mine would negatively impact resources on the US side of the basin (Flathead 
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River International Study Board 1988). Further, the final recommendations of the referral were 
that the mine not be approved as proposed. In a sharp rebuke of the recommendations, the 
Canadian government never accepted the findings of the process (Sax and Keiter 2006, 296). 
Also, those involved in the environmental governance of the international Flathead at the 
Canadian federal and BC provincial levels became less interested in working with their 
downstream US counterparts in the following years (Sexton 2010). 
Effects of the negative stance on collaboration were especially notable over the course of 
back-to-back land use planning processes in BC from 1993 to 2003 (Pers. Comm. Expert #6, 
2018). Both of these processes made a point of designing systems that would facilitate the 
acceleration of extractive industry projects, especially coal, in and around the BC side of the 
river basin (British Columbia Ministry for Sustainable Resource Management 1997 and 2003). 
The efforts to accelerate extractive processes were especially evident in the plan finalized in 
2003. The motivations for working to expedite industrial efforts were partially a result of the 
City of Vancouver, BC winning the bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics in 2003. The 
announcement about hosting the Winter Olympics meant that the Province of BC had even more 
reason to open up resource extraction in the hopes of generating revenue to help pay for the 
upcoming Olympics (Soucek 2012, 67 and Sax and Keiter 2006, 287).  
In the run-up to the Olympics, a coalition of environmental non-profits (E-NGO’s), 
calling themselves Flathead Wild, worked to take advantage of the additional public focus that 
the event would place on BC (Pers. Comm. Expert #5, 2018). The coalition mounted a series of 
successful awareness campaigns (Locke and McKinney 2013, 203). The coalition strategically 
reached out to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee to request that the status of the 
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, be 
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switched from “normal” to “at-risk” following their categorization system (UNESCO 2009). The 
representatives of the coalition argued that the justification for such a switch came from the 
growing environmental pressures being placed on the park, including the threat of pollution from 
coal mining (Pers. Comm. Expert #1, 2018). This effort proved successful, as the UNESCO 
committee voted to conduct an on-the-ground assessment of the park ecosystem to determine the 
credibility of the threat (Soucek 2012). In the months before the Olympics, findings from the 
assessment leaked to the press. 
The findings were that the park ecosystem was indeed threatened and that the proposed 
coal mines were one of the clearest threats (Locke and McKinney 2013). This news, coupled 
with ever growing pressure from the US government and the Flathead Wild campaign, 
eventually forced the hand of the BC government (Soucek 2012). In the hours before the 
Olympics were set to open in 2010, BC announced that they would forever ban mining and oil 
and gas exploration in the international Flathead River basin (Locke and McKinney 2013). The 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between BC and Montana soon followed this 
announcement, which stated that Montana would also follow suit to remove extraction rights 
from its side of the basin (The Province of British Columbia and the State of Montana 2010). 
Though the MOU was not binding, it did succeed in paving the way for the binding mining bans 
enacted by BC and the US within the next 4 years (Pers. Comm. Expert #1, 2018) . As a result of 
these pieces of legislation, the international Flathead River and surrounding basin are better 
protected from environmental threats than ever before.  
However, significant threats to the river’s water quality and broader environmental health 
of the basin still exist. These threats include warming river waters due to climate change, erosion 
due to clear cutting on the BC side of the basin, and growing human use impacts resulting from 
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increased visitation to the US side of the basin (Pers. Comm. Expert #9, 2018 and UNESCO 
2009). Common sentiment seems to be that the work to protect the international Flathead is 
complete (Pers. Comm. Expert #1, 2018). This assumption, however, is far from the truth and 
suggests possible misunderstandings of what current protections on the river and basin actually 
guarantee. A pressing question remains: Is the concept of the dual mining bans better understood 
by the public as the removal of a possible threat or as the addition of a protective layer? Some 
experts say that the answer is as the addition of a protective layer. These experts argue that this 
perception could prevent the public from understanding the need for future efforts to put into 
place more effective protections, such as changing a land designation to remove certain uses 
(Pers. Comm. Experts #1 and #5, 2018). 
Research Purpose and Design 
The recent history of governance of the international Flathead ecosystem suggests that 
future environmental governance of the area needs to do more than just remove threats. 
Strategies to add layers of protection must also be adopted. Ideas that have been put forward in 
the past but have yet to come to fruition include expanding Waterton Lakes National Park on the 
BC side of the basin or adding the “Wilderness” designation to land in the Glacier View Ranger 
District on the US side of the basin in the Flathead National Forest. For these objectives to be 
accomplished groups, individuals, and governments will need to work together even more 
closely in the future than this history shows they did in the past.  
The past has shown that protecting a place like the international Flathead, regardless of 
how highly valued it is, is extremely difficult. Still, the conservation successes that have been 
achieved are remarkable. As such, this accomplishment stands as a chapter in broader 
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transboundary water governance history that demands scrutiny not only to be better understood 
in its own terms; this history also demands analysis to identify what lessons might emerge about 
adaptive governance frameworks that could help inform and guide the future environmental 
governance of the international Flathead as well as of other transboundary water contexts 
globally. Enlisting the concept of adaptive governance (AG) and asking whether the most 
influential events that built towards the river’s protection can be fruitfully understood as a series 
of adaptations to the governance system provides a way to proceed. Analyzing the role of 
adaptation in this transboundary river governance context requires creating nuanced, detailed 
accounts of key past environmental governance processes and outcomes. This study centers on 
only four historical events to ensure that the selected detailed accounts cover a wide range of 
time and can also be in-depth enough to produce meaningful analysis. These accounts will be of 
interest on their own but will also provide the basis for examining the salience of AG for 
understanding this history.  
To achieve these goals, this study sets out two primary research objectives: 1) to describe 
the evolution of environmental governance of the international Flathead River over the past 40 
years in relation to the efforts to prevent proposed mining on the BC side of the basin through the 
identification, description, and analysis of key governance events and outcomes; and 2) to 
evaluate whether any aspect of this evolution constituted the emergence of adaptive governance 
using the framework for AG put forth by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and refined by 
Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014).  
The recent history of the international Flathead is complex and multidimensional. 
Conducting the proposed research thus requires a strategy for focusing attention. In pursuit of 
achieving this study’s objectives my research asks the following questions:   
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1) Over the past 40 years, what 4 processes or events of international Flathead River 
environmental governance were the most influential in preventing the development of 
coal mine on the BC side of the basin? 
a. Which institutions, laws, and social networks were involved in each of these 
processes or events? 
2) Were the criteria necessary for AG to emerge, as identified by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 
(2003) and described by Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014) met during any of the key 
processes or events? 
a. If so, did any of the outcomes of the events or processes constitute adaptations, as 
identified by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and described by Chaffin, Gosnell, 
and Cosens (2014) 
b. If not, what forces prevented the outcomes from being adaptive? 
 
To answer these questions, the thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 presents a 
literature review of research focusing on governance of natural systems. This includes 
descriptions of transboundary water governance, adaptive governance, and an emerging body of 
works that bring the approaches together. Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach 
employed in this study and details my research plan. Next, I give a detailed description of how I 
approached answering each of my research questions and sub-questions. These descriptions lay 
out how I worked to operationalize the criteria and concepts of adaptive governance as thematic 
codes for content analysis.  
Chapter 4 presents the results to RQ1 that identified influential events in the history of 
environmental governance of the international Flathead leading up to the dual mining bans. This 
chapter is broken into four sections; each one contains description of one of the selected 
influential events. These sections function as miniature case studies and each is broken down to 
explain the role of key actors, laws, and, governing bodies in reaching certain outcomes. 
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Description of these four events shows the diversity of institutions involved in the 40-year effort 
to protect the international Flathead from coal mining. Throughout each of the four events, this 
diversity influenced how decisions were made.  
Chapter 5 presents the results to RQ2 and is divided into two sections. First, the four criteria 
necessary for adaptive governance to emerge are found to not have been present early in this 
history but to have emerged by the late 1970s. The second section continues the analysis from 
this period up until 2014 by examining the outcomes of each key event to see whether or not they 
constituted adaptations to the environmental governance context. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
common thread through these results is that the divide in governance between BC and the US 
severely restricts the potential for adaptive outcomes.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by reviewing the findings of the study and discussing lessons 
learned from an analysis of the key historic events. There are common threads present between 
each event that offer valuable insights into how long-term conservation successes can be reached 
in complex natural resource contexts. The chapter also contains discussion of the challenges I 
confronted in operationalizing the AG framework. Though each individual concept and criteria 
contained within the framework emerged from study of real life examples of environmental 
governance around the world, determining the optimal approach to identifying those criteria and 
concepts in historic environmental governance processes proved difficult.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents a brief description of the literature supporting the conceptual 
framework adopted for this study. The central theme of the literature reviewed is research 
focusing on improving understandings and functions of the governance of natural systems. As 
environmental pressures become more acute globally, better understandings of how 
environmental governance works and how to improve it are being sought by researchers. This 
interest has spawned multiple bodies of literature. The first body of literature that I address deals 
with transboundary water governance, which focuses on complex shared freshwater contexts. 
The second body of literature is that of adaptive governance, which emerges from social-
ecological systems thinking. This work confronts the complexity of natural resource contexts by 
proposing a shift in thinking about how governance of these contexts should occur. Finally, I 
describe a growing body of work that apply the concepts of adaptive governance to the problems 
of transboundary water governance in a novel and productive way.  
 Transboundary Water Governance 
	
My analysis of the governance of the international Flathead brings a geographic 
perspective to the topic. My geographic perspective is supported by the work of Cosens (2010), 
Hall (2009), Norman and Bakker (2009) and, Sadler (1986) which approach issues of US-
Canada transboundary water governance from a foundation of geographical knowledge. This 
perspective helps to identify important socio-hydrological interactions within the basin. For 
example, almost all of the coal in the international Flathead River basin is on the BC side of the 
basin. This geographic information may help explain the mindset Canadian actors have brought 
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to past environmental governance decision-making processes. The need to generate novel 
understandings of transboundary water contexts is growing as environmental pressures on these 
systems become more acute globally. This pressure has led to greater incorporation of 
geographic perspectives into research on environmental governance. 
Environmental governance is defined as “the system of institutions, including rules, laws, 
regulations, policies, social norms, and organizations involved in governing environmental 
resource use and/or protection” (Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens 2014, 1). For the purposes of this 
study, the system of actors and institutions involved in the environmental governance of a 
specific place or resource at any one point in time will be referred to as the environmental 
governance context (EGC) of that place or resource at that time. Though the term environmental 
governance context is a creation of this study, the idea for it emerges from discussion of systems 
of environmental governance by Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014), Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 
(2003), and Folke et al. (2005).  
Research into environmental governance offers new ways of understanding and 
responding to complexity in natural resource contexts. This creative thinking can be especially 
helpful for contexts where governance of an ecological system, such as a river basin, is divided 
by an international border. This basin division means environmental governance of the system is 
shared by two countries, and the institutions present within each of them, who may or may not 
agree about the best use of the water in question (Akamani and Wilson 2011, 409). Further, the 
potential of the countries involved to agree on how to use the water is complicated by several 
intersecting factors. These complicating factors include divergent water-use agendas, 
mismatched scales of authority, and complex geographies (Wescoat and Halvorson 2013, 87). 
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Each of these complicating factors can impact governance of any transboundary water body, but 
they do so differently depending on the specific type of transboundary water body in question.  
There are three different primary types of transboundary water bodies; common pool 
resources, integrated river basins, and upstream-downstream rivers (Sadler 1986, 361). The 
differences between each of these water bodies create varied power relationships between the 
countries sharing governance. These power relationships help define the roles that factors, such 
as mismatched scales of authority, can play in determining the shape of a transboundary water 
governance context. Sadler’s (1986) brief descriptions of the attributes of each different type of 
transboundary water body helps to explain these concepts.  
A common pool resource, such as the Great Lakes system, is one where both countries 
have equal potential to impact or be impacted by the condition of the resource. These impacts 
create a mutual concern between each country and incentivizes treating the resource well. An 
integrated river basin, such as the Columbia River, which contains some waters that cross back 
and forth between Canada and the US, is one where the actions of the upstream country have 
implications for both countries involved. This scenario creates incentives for both countries to 
work together on governance but can also complicate such efforts because of the dynamic 
interrelations created by such complex bio-geographies. The final type of transboundary water 
body is an upstream-downstream river, which simply passes from one country to another. A 
good example of this is the international Flathead River, which passes from BC and into 
Montana. The water use decisions made regarding these types of upstream-downstream rivers 
are not felt equally by both countries. Instead, for the most part, the impacts are primarily felt by 
the downstream country. This arrangement removes a significant amount of incentive for the 
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upstream country to act equitably towards the downstream country in water governance decision-
making processes.  
Each of these types of transboundary water bodies creates a different type of power 
relationship between the countries involved. Knowledge of the nuances of a specific 
transboundary river context, such as which country will be more impacted by certain actions, can 
make cooperation between countries sharing water governance responsibilities more likely than 
conflict between them (Sadler 1986, 359).  
The strong connections between understanding the geopolitical specifics of a 
transboundary water context and improving governance outcomes in that context have been 
understood by researchers for over 20 years (Wolf 1997). For almost as long, researchers have 
also understood that social scientists’ knowledge of transboundary water governance contexts is 
limited and that there has historically been insufficient data for researchers to draw meaningful 
conclusions about the causes of success or failure of these governance systems (Bernauer 2002, 
2). Further, the criteria for measuring performance of these systems are disputed as well (ibid.). 
In response, some researchers have worked to build and then analyze large databases of historic 
data on successes and failures of transboundary water governance systems (Wolf, Yoffe, and 
Giordano 2003). Others have concentrated on developing in-depth case studies of individual 
rivers to look for specific trends and outcomes (Sneddon and Fox 2006).  
Adaptive Governance 
	
Another approach of researchers working on transboundary water governance at multiple 
scales and across international, state and sub-state levels, has been to apply the model of adaptive 
governance to analyses of complex water contexts (Akamani and Wilson 2011, Chaffin et al. 
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2016, and Cosens 2010). This approach to understanding environmental governance is described 
by Akamini and Wilson (2011) as offering an intuitive path forward given that the concepts 
underlying AG line up well with the complexity of transboundary water contexts. The research 
that spawned the concept of AG was initially motivated by a search for better means of 
confronting the growing complexity and uncertainty of natural resource contexts globally 
(Chaffin et al. 2014). 
The concepts underlying adaptive governance initially emerged from work on common 
pool resources, such as research on offshore fisheries (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). This work 
helped develop the concept of social-ecological systems, which rebukes the traditional 
understanding of relationships between humans and natural systems as being largely one-
directional. Instead, social-ecological systems thinking views the relationship between humans 
and natural systems as a dynamic and complex feedback cycle that inextricably links ecological 
functions with human actions (Berkes and Folke 1998, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, Folke et 
al. 2005, and Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). A central issue within this thinking is the 
question of whether or not the environmental governance framework of the social-ecological 
system can respond to change, be it a drought or pollution from a coal mine, in a co-evolutionary 
manner (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1907-1908).  
There are significant challenges associated with environmental governance of any system 
at any point in time. For instance, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003, 1911) say that that: 
The idea of governance conveys the difficulty of control, the need to proceed in the face 
of substantial uncertainty, and the importance of dealing with diversity and reconciling 
conflict among people and groups who differ in values, interests, perspectives, power, 
and the kinds of information they bring to situations. 
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For the system to be able to respond to changes in a selective, evolutionary manner that 
generates preferred social and ecological governance outcomes, the system must be flexible and 
responsive to new conditions. This co-evolution, or adaptation, is vital because ecological 
systems are constantly changing, whether in response to broader environmental pressures or 
shifting human uses (Folke et al. 2005). The concept of a form of environmental governance that 
can respond to change, such as shifting resource use, in a manner that embodies a co-
evolutionary relationship emerges as AG. 
Though there are multiple definitions of AG, a relatively straight forward one defines to 
concept of AG as “a range of interactions between actors, networks, organizations, and 
institutions emerging in pursuit of a desired state for social-ecological systems” (Chaffin, 
Gosnell, and Cosens 2014, 1). AG is thought to be particularly encouraging for the future of 
environmental governance because many of the extreme and dangerous environmental pressures 
being experienced globally are thought to be, at least partially, the result of traditional, top-down, 
state-centric approaches to natural resource governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011, 414). 
Discussion of AG can sometimes be abstract but the individual concepts underlying AG are more 
grounded. These concepts were initially put forward by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003). 
In their review of the past decade’s literature on AG, however, Chaffin, Gosnell, and 
Cosens (2014) make the set of concepts easier to work with by separating them into two lists and 
framing them more explicitly. Citing Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003), Chaffin, Gosnell, and 
Cosens (2014) first put forth the conditions that are necessary for AG to emerge. This list is 
made up of four criteria: “inclusive dialogue between resource users (analytic deliberation); 
complex, redundant, layered institutions (nesting); mixed institutional types; and institutional 
designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change” (Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens 
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2014, 4). These are the conditions that must exist in the broader environmental governance 
context in order for AG to be able to emerge. Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014) next describe 
what Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) said AG should do once it has emerged: “(1) provide 
information (science and local knowledge); (2) deal with conflict; (3) induce rule compliance; 
(4) provide infrastructure; and (5) be prepared for change” (ibid.). Taken together, these lists 
offer some clarity for what AG looks like in real-world contexts. In recognition of this, Chaffin, 
Gosnell, and Cosens (2014, 4) note that this second list “provides a prescriptive research agenda 
going forward.”  
Finding Utility for AG in Transboundary Water Governance Analyses 
	
Though not explicitly based on this specific framework for AG, several recent works 
have adopted concepts related to AG and social-ecological systems thinking to their analysis of 
transboundary river governance (Cosens 2010, Akamani and Wilson 2011, and Chaffin et al. 
2016).  The work of Cosens (2010), in particular, offers an interesting approach to this research 
as she develops a perspective on the future of the Columbia River Treaty by looking back over a 
series of key events that have impacted the Columbia River basin since the final joint 
ramification of the treaty in 1964. This analysis of the causality of past events allows her to draw 
strong conclusions about the capacity of the treaty to protect the social-ecological system of the 
Columbia River basin from future uncertainty and change. Cosens (2010) determined that the 
administrative framework surrounding management of environmental systems in the US, and in 
particular the Columbia River system, is top-heavy due to excessive state and federal control of 
local issues. Specifically, Cosens (2010, 265) notes that to improve the potential of future 
management of the Columbia River to contend with increasing environmental complexity there 
must be an infusion of resources at the local level along with continued involvement of state and 
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federal programs to provide information and coordination. If this adjustment towards greater 
local control were to happen, the author does see potential for improved management of social-
ecological systems through authorizing greater flexibility in decision-making and increased 
public participation to hold actors accountable. Cosens (2010, 265) finishes her article by calling 
for these reforms to be enacted “to allow us, as a responsible society, to respond to the challenge 
of managing multi-jurisdictional watersheds.”  
The work of Chaffin et al. (2016, 113), which incorporated concepts of adaptive 
governance into a quantitative social network analysis of stakeholders in the Klamath River 
basin, was partially inconclusive in identifying transitions towards adaptive governance. This 
result was not surprising though, as the authors note in the introduction that examples of adaptive 
governance in real-world contexts have been difficult to identify and analyze. The authors go on 
to explain that this difficulty is partly the result of adaptive governance generally being an 
emergent phenomenon instead of one that can be mandated or legislated. For Chaffin et al. 
(2016), another key roadblock is how long conditions in the social-ecological system can take to 
detectably respond to changes in the governance of the system. This lag in response, which they 
note can take decades, makes identifying environmental governance contexts to study in the 
search of knowledge on adaptive governance particularly difficult. Chaffin et al. (2016, 119) 
argue, based upon this difficulty, that studying transitions towards adaptive governance in real-
time is the best response. In the conclusion of the article however, the authors also note that 
incorporation of data resulting from nuanced qualitative analyses of historical governance 
contexts can help illuminate how adaptive governance can be reached (ibid.). To test this finding, 
this study used qualitative methods to generate and question accounts of historical governance 
contexts. This process of analysis will be described in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Each transboundary water context has a distinct mix of geographic and political scales. 
This study is not an effort to compare the international Flathead to other rivers; instead, it is an 
effort to understand the specific forces at play in the distinct geopolitical space that is the 
international Flathead. For this reason, the present study adopts a case study approach to building 
knowledge of the history, evolution, and current state of international Flathead governance. The 
case study approach has been partnered with two qualitative methods to gather and analyze data. 
These qualitative methods, key informant interviews and content analysis of textual sources, 
enhance each other through research design intended to build towards conclusions in an iterative 
process. This process included the approach I took to operationalize the concepts and criteria in 
the AG framework. I will describe my use of key informant interviews first.  
Key Informant Interviews 
	
 Key informants are people who are central figures in the area of analysis or gate keepers 
of the setting (Hesse-Biber 2017, 192). For this project, key informants were experts with 
extensive personal and professional experience in the events that produced the international 
Flathead’s recent history, particularly in relation to the threat of coal mining. Purposive 
sampling, which produces a sample that can be assumed to be representative of a population, was 
used to select individuals for key informant interviews who met these criteria (Lavrakas 2008). I 
started with a list of potential participants with whom I was already acquainted and then 
employed snowball sampling to reach the rest. This approach was especially important in 
generating contact information for Canadian subjects, with whom I was less familiar at the 
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beginning of the research. In total, I interviewed 10 experts, six from the US and four from 
Canada. Each of these people, nine men and one woman, had first-hand experience with some 
aspect of the effort to prevent coal mining on the BC side of the international Flathead over the 
past 40 years. The list of experts included freshwater ecologists, conservation journalists, E-
NGO staff, and City Councilman.  
 I developed and used a semi-structured interview guide, shown below in Appendix 1, 
which guaranteed that the interviews were consistent and comparable but also allowed 
flexibility. Probes and follow-up questions employed where clarification or greater depth was 
needed. The interviews generally lasted between 40 minutes and an hour and a half. I transcribed 
each interview fully in preparation for content analysis. Due to time and travel constraints, only 
three interviews were conducted in person. Broadly, the topic of the interview guide was the 
evolution of governance of the international Flathead over the past 40 years in response to the 
threat of coal mining in the BC side of the basin. For instance, during the interviews, subjects 
were asked specifically to name which events in the history of proposed coal mining in the 
international Flathead they considered to be most influential in preventing the mining from ever 
occurring. Answers to questions like these were used to inform findings generated through use of 
the next method, content analysis.  
Content Analysis 
	
Given the historic timeframe as well as the breadth of variables that influence and shape 
governance of a dynamic natural resource, textual sources offer some of the greatest depth of 
data on this topic. As a result, the primary method in this study is qualitative content analysis, 
which is a technique for systematic analysis of textual sources (Mayring 2000). A broad range of 
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texts were potentially useful including newspaper articles, gray literature (such as reports 
generated by ecological research), and peer-reviewed journal articles. The process of identifying, 
locating, and collecting these texts from online databases and physical archives has been the 
work of the past two years; conducted while also completing multiple, more focused reports 
leading up to the present thesis project.  
I sought to collect documents that addressed the history of efforts to prevent coal mining 
in the international Flathead from 1974 to 2014. To do this, I searched multiple online databases, 
including the University of Montana Mansfield Library, ResearchGate, and the Internet Archive. 
In these searches I used search terms such as “Cabin Creek coal mine,” “North Fork of the 
Flathead River,” and “IJC referral.”  I also visited the Glacier National Park archives where 
documents and records relating to the administration of the park are stored and the Whitefish, 
Montana office of the National Parks Conservation Association where papers relating to past 
international Flathead conservation efforts are stored. At these archives, I searched documents 
initially by year and then by key terms similar to the ones previously mentioned.  
All of these documents were saved as word-searchable PDFs. This collection of material 
included the transcripts from the key informant interviews I conducted. The resulting database 
spans 40 years of international Flathead history and is focused on the proposed coal mines in the 
BC Flathead basin. The database I created encompasses the following: 750 pages of relevant 
newspaper articles, correspondence of elected officials and, environmental non-profit reports; ten 
reports describing the findings of scientific studies of the international Flathead; ten key 
informant interview transcripts; and over 75 academic works ranging from several theses written 
by former University of Montana students to articles from law reviews and academic journals. 
Analysis of these sources, along with my own extensive personal exposure to the international 
26 
	
Flathead basin over the past seven years, provided me with a foundation of knowledge upon 
which to build through my research endeavors.  
 Next, I read the collected material and organized it in four stages that were linked to the 
research questions driving my study. Stage one focused on coding data to answer RQ1: over the 
past 40 years, what 4-6 processes or events of international Flathead River environmental 
governance were the most influential in preventing the development of coal mine on the BC side 
of the basin? This stage also included analysis of the data, which also served as the beginning of 
coding to answer RQ1 because RQ1 required chronological analysis. As I collected documents, I 
stored and organized them on the following basis: date of event discussed, events or topics 
covered, and source. I created a catalog of these documents using Excel. Then, using the date of 
topic discussed rather than the date of publication, I arranged the documents chronologically into 
folders divided by time period (i.e. decade). When documents covered multiple decades, they 
were saved as different documents in each correct folder with the different relevant content 
highlighted. This process was methodical in that I used a deductive coding process to identify the 
decade or decades the source covered, the topics addressed, and a part of the research process. 
This interaction with the data got me closer to identifying the key events in this timeline. Based 
on this initial ordering and analysis, I created a preliminary list of key events based on the 
frequency an event was described as being influential, crucial, or important in both the interview 
transcripts and the document database. This initial list of events is provided below in 
chronological order. Given the historical nature of the subject, this list also came to serve as a 
timeline of the story, becoming more complete as the analysis progressed. 
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Year(s) Preliminary List of Key Historic Events 
1974 the news of the proposed Cabin Ck. mine breaking 
1974-1977 the emergence of the Flathead Coalition  
1974-1977 
the pressure applied by (then) Representative Max Baucus 
resulting in federal attention and funding 
1985-1988 the IJC referral and resulting study publication 
1993-2003 
the BC land use planning processes around the turn of the 
century 
mid-2000's 
the news of proposed coal bed methane (CBM) mining in 
the BC Flathead basin 
mid-2000's 
the emergence of a transboundary coalition of E-NGO’s, 
Flathead Wild, in opposition of Flathead mining  
2004 
the BC sale of permits to conduct CBM extraction receiving 
no bids  
2009 
the UNESCO/IUCN study on the impacts of coal mining on 
Waterton-Glacier IPP 
late-2000's 
the collaboration of (then) Montana Governor Brian 
Schweitzer with (then) BC Premiere Gordon Campbell  
2010 
the signing of the MOU between MT and BC on the eve of 
the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, BC 
2011-2014 
BC and the US formally removing mineral rights from the 
international Flathead basin 
Table 1: Preliminary List of Key Historic Events  
	
Using additional familiarity with the events gained from conducting the thematic coding required 
to answer RQ2 and RQ2a, I later refined this list and selected four critical events to examine 
closely. Explanation of the refinement process is provided at the beginning of Chapter 4, which 
presents the four case studies.  
Stage two focused on analyzing data to answer RQ1a: Which institutions, laws, and 
social networks were involved in these key processes or events? To answer this question, I 
developed case studies of these events drawing on information and knowledge I gained during 
the interviews and the organization and coding of documents. These sources, along with my own 
extensive personal exposure to the North Fork basin over the past seven years, provided me with 
context and background to inform the selection of the case studies. Having previously organized 
my documents by decade of topic discussed, I was able to efficiently organize them by relevance 
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to each key event. This process left me with four folders, each composed of the documents 
containing the necessary data I needed to identify the most relevant aspects of each event. 
Development of each case study was the result of then compiling the information contained 
within the documents and using the information to build historical descriptions of how each 
event proceeded, who the key institutions and people involved were, and why they were 
important.  
 The third stage of content analysis focused on coding to answer RQ2: Were the criteria 
necessary for AG to emerge, as identified by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) and described by 
Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014), met during any of the key processes or events? Here, I 
operationalized the four criteria necessary for AG to emerge in order for me to use them as 
thematic codes. These four criteria are: (1) analytic deliberation; (2) nested governance; (3) 
mixed institutional types; and (4) institutional designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, 
and change. To operationalize these criteria I reviewed seminal articles on AG including the 
works of Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003), Folke et al. (2005), Cosens (2010) and Chaffin, 
Gosnell, and Cosens (2014) and identified and recorded definitions of each criterion that were 
clear and well suited to this analysis. At the same time, I noted key words authors used when to 
describe these criteria and collected them into a list. Reviewing this material —the key terms and 
the definitions—I chose definitions and key terms that I thought most clearly and accurately 
reflected the criteria as they might appear in my textual sources. Then, I organized this material 
into a table. (please see Table 5 in Chapter 5). This table defines each criteria succinctly and lists 
key phrases or ideas that are associated with it. Not all of these criteria are well-established 
concepts in the literature. Further, none of them are easily measured. This table offered a way to 
view each criteria as a series of ideas. Those ideas, in tandem with the criteria themselves, were 
29 
	
then used as thematic codes, in analysis of the relevant institutions and their interrelationships to 
answer the research question. 
The fourth stage of content analysis involved coding data to address RQ2a: Did any of 
the outcomes of the events or processes constitute adaptations, as identified by Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern (2003) and described by Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014)? And, if not, what forces 
prevented the outcomes from being adaptive? This coding followed a process similar to the one 
used to answer RQ2. When governance outcomes are adaptive to the shifting conditions of the 
surrounding EGC they bring about the following characteristics of environmental governance, as 
put forth by the AG framework: outcomes should provide information (scientific and local 
knowledge), deal with conflict, induce rule compliance, provide infrastructure, and be prepared 
for change. Next, I operationalized these characteristics as thematic codes for use in content 
analysis of the four key events. This process mirrored the one used to answer RQ2: I consulted 
the same seminal articles for definitions and key terms and ideas. To organize these, I developed 
a similar table, which is shown in Chapter 5 as Table 6. I then used these five criteria, and their 
associated key terms and ideas, as thematic codes to analyze textual data associated with each of 
the outcomes from the key events that RQ2 had determined met the criteria necessary for AG to 
emerge. To do this, I searched the data I had on each event using the list of key terms I had 
created looking for ideas that illustrated the associated concept.  Where the key terms or ideas of 
a concept were found, I determined whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
instance qualified as fitting the definition of the concept in question. The results of these analyses 
are presented in Chapter 5 in a series of simple tables that accompany brief justifications of the 
determinations. Included within these descriptions is a synthesis and assessment in regards to 
whether or not the outcome of the key event being analyzed was adaptive. 
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Reflections on Position and Process 
 
Importantly, because of my extended contact with the data and place, I brought an 
informed perspective to the thesis research and writing process. I have considered the Flathead as 
a river to be protected since I first saw it in 2010. This conviction, as well as my understanding 
of the complexity of this goal, has only deepened as the Flathead Valley has become my home 
and the broader Flathead basin my backyard. My scholarly research has expanded and refined 
my comprehension of the issues as well as the precarious realities of this majestic basin. These 
realities can be viewed a number of ways through the lens of academic integrity. 
The views I brought to my thesis work could have conceivably closed my mind to ideas 
or information that seemed counter to my prior understanding. To avoid this, I purposefully re-
examined my understanding of crucial events as new information was discovered.	My initial lack 
of knowledge about the Canadian perspective on these issues exemplifies this. On the 
recommendation of my thesis committee following my thesis proposal defense, I sought out 
Canadian perspectives through interviews with experts from BC and articles from Canadian 
academic institutes and media outlets. As it turns out, the basic narrative I learned from my 
Canadian sources is, indeed, different in significant ways from the typical US narrative. These 
realizations altered the direction of my work in notable ways. Not only was this discovery 
somewhat surprising to me initially, it was also instructive. I now more fully understand how, 
especially in transboundary contexts, the story you hear from actors on one side of the border, 
however detailed, will always differ in important ways from the story you hear from the other 
side.  
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CHAPTER 4: KEY HISTORIC EVENTS IDENTIFIED AND DESCRIBED 
 
 The results to RQ1 are presented in this chapter. These results are presented in two major 
sections. First, the details of the logic and sampling approach are given for how the entries of the 
preliminary list of key historic events were weighted to generate a list ranked by how influential 
each event was. Second, brief but detailed descriptions of each of the selected most influential 
events are offered. This analytic process advances the analysis of international Flathead River 
governance along a 40 year timeline from events in 1974 to events in 2014. Over the course of 
this window of time, news of proposed coal mining on the BC side of the international Flathead 
basin becomes public in the US leading to a series of public responses, the US and Canada agree 
to enter into an IJC referral process to resolve their disagreement over proposed coal mining in 
the BC side of international Flathead basin, a series of land use planning processes in BC focus 
on facilitating extractive industry efforts in the international Flathead Basin, and, finally, BC and 
the US agree to forever ban mining and extractive processes in the international Flathead in the 
run-up to the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver following a public awareness campaign about 
the proposed mining.  
Identification of Key Historic Events 
	
 In identifying each of these key events, several characteristics were taken into account 
when weighting each event. These included the frequency of mentions of an event in interviews, 
how close events were to one another in the timeline, whether or not an event was mentioned by 
interview subjects on both sides of the border, and the incidence of mentions of events in 
relevant literature. I will give multiple examples of this process to shed light on how 
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determinations occurred. Some events were given high places on the list even though they were 
not frequently mentioned in both the literature and interview transcripts. The best example of this 
are first three events in the preliminary list, all having to do with the initial response of river 
advocates to the news of a proposed coal mine, and the BC land use planning processes around 
the turn of the century. These events were less mentioned for good reasons. First, the three 
events from the beginning of the timeline were frequently mentioned in literature analyzing that 
time period. The events were not frequently mentioned in interviews though. This appears to 
largely be due to the fact that only two of the experts that I interviewed were involved in the 
proceedings at that time. Most of the other eight were aware of these events but they were not 
personally involved in them and seemed less willing to speak to their influence on future events. 
When these factors were weighed, these three events moved high up the list. Also, because each 
of these events was hard to separate from one another due to their tight causal relationships, they 
were combined into one single entry on the list.  
Next, the BC land use planning processes around the turn of the century were only 
occasionally mentioned in the literature and mentioned by fewer than half of the interviewees as 
having been crucial. The reason that this event was still weighted as being highly influential is 
that all of the people who I interviewed who were involved in the processes, (i.e. the four 
Canadians interviewed), placed high importance on the outcomes of the planning processes. 
Given that these were also the people best positioned to speak to the importance of this event, the 
event was placed high on the list weighed by overall influence. The final list, weighted by levels 
of influence, is below.  
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Year(s) List of Key Historic Events Ranked by Influence 
2009-2010 
1. the UNESCO/IUCN study on the impacts of coal 
mining on Waterton-Glacier IPP + the signing of the 
MOU between MT and BC on the eve of the 2010 
Winter Olympics in Vancouver, BC 
1985-1988 2. the IJC referral and resulting study publication 
1974-1977 
3. the news of the proposed mine breaking in 1974 + the 
emergence of the Flathead Coalition + the pressure 
applied by (then) Representative Max Baucus resulting 
in federal attention and funding 
1993-2003 
4. the BC land use planning processes around the turn 
of the century 
2011-2014 
5. BC and the US formally removing mineral rights from 
the international Flathead basin 
mid-2000's 
6. the news of proposed coal bed methane (CBM) mining in 
the BC Flathead basin 
mid-2000's 
7. the emergence of a transboundary coalition of E-NGO’s, 
Flathead Wild, in opposition of Flathead mining  
2004 
8. the BC sale of permits to conduct CBM extraction 
receiving no bids  
late-2000's 
9. the collaboration of (then) Montana Governor Brian 
Schweitzer with (then) BC Premiere Gordon Campbell  
Table 2: List of Key Historic Events Ranked by Influence 
 
The final four most influential events are bolded at the top of the above list. Similar to 
how the events of the 1970s were hard to separate from one another, as previously discussed, the 
UNESCO/IUCN study findings, leaked to the public in 2009, were hard to separate from the 
MOU signing on the eve of the 2010 Winter Olympics. For this reason, the two events were 
combined into one. Fortunately, those two events, along with the 1985 IJC referral process, were 
mentioned by every single interview subject and all of the relevant literature as being extremely 
influential. As for selections #3 and #4, previously discussed factors moved them up the list. 
However, another important reason that BC planning processes were placed high on the final list 
was that, similar to how the events of the mid-1970’s primarily involved US actors and 
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governance, it primarily involved BC actors and governance. These selections also meant that 
the final set of events would include each decade of the subject’s history.  
Description of Historic Events: Context and Synthesis 
 
The following four sections outline the events and processes between 1974 and 2014 that 
had the most influence on preventing coal mining and other extractive activities on the BC side 
of the international Flathead River basin. Each of the four sections is a brief historical 
description. Though each section can be seen as a freestanding event and/or process, viewing the 
four sections collectively, as a progression, offers a clearer explanation of how conservation 
advocates were able to prevent the successful development of coal mining operations in the river 
basin. Viewing the four sections as glimpses into the events on a historical timeline that is full of 
important occurrences outside of the ones described here is helpful for understanding why the 
BC and Canadian governments eventually acceded and agreed to remove mining rights. 
Specifically, what is not well captured by the description of the four selected freestanding events 
and processes is that between each of them momentum was building, networks were being 
developed, and decisions were being made amongst both those interested in preventing mining 
and those interested in enabling or conducting mining. For instance, the history of the coalition 
of E-NGOs that was vital to the final push to convince BC to remove mining rights in the basin 
can be traced back to 1974 when river advocates first responded to news of a proposed coal 
mine. Though the descriptions offered in the following four sections offer depth that allows for 
deeper understanding of the causality and meaning of events, remembering that these events 
were strongly influenced by factors that were in play leading up to them is important as well.  
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Cabin Creek Realities 
	
In Montana in early 1974, news broke that a transnational coal mining company was 
seriously assessing the viability of a mine site in southeast British Columbia in the Flathead 
Basin. The details that surfaced explained the company Sage Creek Coal Limited (SCCL) had 
been exploring Crown Land, which is analogous to public land in the US, in the area since 1968 
(Wilson 1984, 112). In pursuit of the ideal mine site, SCCL had been conducting mapping, 
trenching, drilling, and testing in the basin (Espeseth 1979, 5). The coal in the upper basin is 
particularly valuable because it is metallurgical coal that can be used in the steel making process 
but challenging to extract due to the complex surrounding terrain (Wilson 1984 and Espeseth 
1979).  
Eventually, SCCL settled on a site that encompassed two hills on either side of Cabin 
Creek, which is a tributary of the international Flathead (Flathead Basin Commission 1983). 
Industry-friendly regulations in BC slowed release of news in Montana about the exploration and 
of a proposal to conduct mining on this site (Espeseth 1979, 9). Montana officials became aware 
of what they called “the rumors” of an impending coal mine and inquired for more information 
(Schneider 1976, 38). As a result of these inquiries, information about the mines slowly reached 
the public through a series of articles in 1974 and 1975 in local Montana and US national 
publications. 
Some Montana and US government officials were quick to take a strong stance on the 
proposed mine. Perhaps the most outspoken was Jim Posewitz, then chief of the Environment 
and Information Section of the Montana Fish and Game Department (MFGD). Posewitz is 
quoted in a 1974 Missoulian article saying that “there’s reason to be concerned (about the mining 
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activities)” and that “there’s quite a bit more probing to do before we’ll know exactly what 
impact the coal mine across Cabin Creek would have on the Flathead” (Burk 1974, 11). Another 
administrative body on the US side that responded to the news was the Flathead National Forest 
office. Officials there noted that in light of this news the Forest Service should set up a water 
quality monitoring station on the US side of the Flathead before mining began to get baseline 
water quality data (Burk 1974, 11). Though the trickle of information on this issue hindered 
public response to the news, by late 1974 both informal and formal resistance had begun. 
The most notable informal resistance to the proposed mine was the community advocacy 
group, the Flathead Coalition. This group formed around the idea of uniting a broad base of 
opposition to pollution from coal mining in the Flathead basin (Wilson 1984, 113). The cause 
soon attracted support among an impressive array of institutions, including the Kalispell 
Chamber of Commerce, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, the British Columbia 
Wildlife Federation, the League of Women Voters, the National Parks Conservation Association, 
and many other citizen groups (Espeseth 1979, 92). As Wayne Herman, founding member of the 
coalition and an eventual member of the board of directors noted in 2004, “This coalition 
brought together broad segments of our community who typically were not in agreement about 
various community issues. But this mining threat to our waters was a unifying issue back in the 
1970s…” (Flathead Coalition 2004, 1).  
Indeed, by the end of 1975, the FC was publishing bi-monthly newsletters, investigating 
potential legal actions against SCCL, and strongly lobbying Montana elected officials to 
formally oppose the mine proposal as well as fund a study on its potential effects (Flathead Basin 
Commission 1983, 11 and Wilson 1984, 113). These actions spurred both (then) Representative 
Max Baucus and the Montana State Legislature. Initially, Baucus pursued meetings with 
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Canadian officials, including a meeting with representatives of SCCL’s parent company, Rio 
Algom, in Toronto, to gather information on the issue (Hoklin 1977, 2). Following that meeting, 
Baucus formally called upon the US State Department to pursue an International Joint 
Commission referral with Canada under the Boundary Waters Treaty to investigate the mine 
(ibid.).  
Responding to rising public outcry, in 1975, the Montana State Legislature called upon 
the state Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) to review state held data 
on the Flathead riverine system as well as to assess the implications of mining in the area 
(Wilson 1984, 113). Though there was a significant amount of data for the DNRC to use in this 
study, the analysis published in 1977 was inadequate in assessing the specific potential impacts 
of the mine (ibid.). This outcome suggested to local conservation advocates that their voice was 
loud enough to make change, i.e. trigger a state-level study such as the 1977 DNRC study, but 
not yet loud enough to make a significant difference, i.e. trigger a study with enough funding to 
collect the information necessary to draw clear conclusions. As a result, groups of local 
conservation advocates began to more strongly lobby (then) Representative Max Baucus to work 
to generate federal funding for a study.  
The most important groups in this effort were the Flathead Coalition and the Flathead 
Interagency Technical Committee, which was an ad-hoc group of local scientists and resource 
policy makers (Flathead Basin Commission 1983, 11). This group was convinced that gathering 
as much scientific information as possible on the impacts of coal mining was the best way to 
help preserve the international Flathead (ibid.). Urged on by the Flathead Coalition, the 
committee found that their efforts in convincing Baucus were successful (Wilson 1984, 113). He 
was able to secure a nearly three million dollar appropriation from the Environmental Protection 
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Agency in 1977 to conduct an environmental impact study of the Flathead basin (Flathead Basin 
Commission 1983, 1).  Aptly, this study would come to be named the Flathead River Basin 
Environmental Impact Study (FRBEIS).  
The structure of this study and the decision-making process behind its design is an 
important part of the overall relevance of the study. The study did not focus on a single 
development project or a limited impact area and instead used a “regional perspective” to 
consider the entire basin and the cumulative impacts of “many seemingly unrelated” actions 
(Flathead Basin Commission 1983, 12). This meant that areas of study focus were not just 
different aspects of the riverine system but were also the regional economy, airshed, aquatic 
ecosystem, and riparian wildlife habitat (ibid.). The holistic nature of this approach ensured that 
there would be an opportunity for previously unseen connections between forces to emerge and 
for there to be a well-rounded body of baseline data for future use. Interestingly, though the EIS 
in FRBEIS is the same acronym as that of an Environmental Impact Statement, FRBEIS came 
before the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) was passed. Thus, the FRBEIS was 
not an EIS in the now common sense. Instead, FRBEIS was an environmental impact study.  
A significant reason that this progressive holistic approach was taken on the FRBEIS was 
that, as the Flathead Basin Commission final report (1983, 12) notes, “because the study was 
initiated in direct response to residents’ concerns, (the) EPA established a locally based, 
volunteer citizen panel to run the study.”  This panel was composed of a diverse and locally 
representative set of engaged individuals. As one of my interview subjects noted about the 
importance of the selection of local scientists: “These were local scientists who we knew from 
(GNP), from our community, from FWP (Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks)…they were 
actually trusted individuals even at a time when the Feds were not always really welcomed or 
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trusted around here” (Pers. Comm. Expert #1, 2018). To further the significance of this selection, 
the panel also had oversight over study design, funding allocation, and overall focus of the 
research. For these reasons, FRBEIS stands out in terms of transparency, involvement of non-
traditional perspectives, viewing the study site as a bioregion with interconnected human and 
ecological interactions, understanding of position in the geopolitical context present at the time, 
and general thoroughness.  
Not surprisingly, the findings of the study were that the potential side effects of coal 
mining on Cabin Creek would have been devastating. An interesting twist, though, is that many 
of the other possible resource extraction activities on both sides of the international Flathead 
basin, such as logging or oil and natural gas drilling, were also found to have many potentially 
negative impacts. Whether simply through due-diligence or, as Wilson (1984, 114) argues, an 
intentional effort to force BC’s hand by showing that the US was concerned with environmental 
harm originating from actions anywhere in the basin and not just on the BC side. Either way, the 
study results soon proved to be useful as BC offered an opportunity for Montana to submit 
comments on the proposed coal mines. A large portion of the Montana submission consisted of 
data from the FRBEIS. As a result of the pressure applied by these findings, the BC government 
did add conditions to its approval of the mining project for the company, Sage Creek (Wilson 
1984, 117). This added a level of scientific analysis to the permitting process for which the 
company had not previously been responsible. Another key outcome of this study was the 
creation of the Flathead Basin Commission.  
The findings of the FRBEIS revealed the complexity of preserving the high quality of the 
water found within the Flathead system as well as the direness of the threat of coal mining to the 
system. Upon reviewing these findings, the Montana Legislature voted in 1983 to create and 
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fund the Flathead Basin Commission (FBC) (Flathead Basin Commission 1983, 174). So deep 
was the connection between the FRBEIS findings and the passage of the FBC Law that the 
enabling legislation for the FBC makes up the final two pages of the FRBEIS report (ibid.). 
Simply put, the Montana Legislature hoped that the FBC would be able to protect against threats 
like the proposed coal mines to protect the water quality of the Flathead system.  
In order to protect the water quality of the Flathead, the hope was that the FBC would 
“serve as a forum for dialogue between all parties involved in land and resource management in 
the Flathead Basin” (Flathead Basin Commission 1983, 174). The commission would monitor 
the Flathead ecosystem, scrutinize its management, provide resulting information to all involved 
stakeholders, and bring those stakeholders together to deliberate on governance of the system 
(Flathead Basin Commission 1983, 183-184). Importantly, the language laid out by the 
Legislature for the structure of the commission made clear that this collaboration would have to 
occur with a broad array of stakeholders. The 15 members of the commission would be 
appointed by an array of largely governmental institutions, from the USDA to the Bonneville 
Power Administration to three Montana Governor-selected industrial or environmental groups 
effected by the work of the FBC (ibid.). Unfortunately, out of the 15, only one member was to be 
a representative of British Columbia.  
Though collaborating with the BC government on transboundary water issues was also 
listed as an express duty of the commission, some thought that there was not enough of an 
emphasis put on working with BC. To some residents in BC, this lack of emphasis may have 
reached the level of a perceived slight, feeding a narrative that the US “looked down” on Canada 
(Pers. Comm. Expert #7, 2018). That said, the FBC has played a key role in numerous important 
international Flathead water quality issues since 1983. These include helping organize a land use 
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planning process for the community on the Montana side of the international Flathead basin in 
the early 1990’s to make coordination with BC land use plans easier (Flathead Basin 
Commission 1991 and Sexton 2010, 3), providing a conduit for scientists working with the 
National Park Conservation Association to work with the Montana Legislature to design (and 
fund) a research study on Flathead water quality (Pers. Comm. Expert #6, 2018), and act as a 
bridging organization between the advocacy efforts for the international Flathead in the 1980’s 
and the advocacy efforts that happened when the mining issue re-emerged in the 2000s (Pers. 
Comm. Expert #1, 2018).  
International Joint Commission Referral 
	
In the years following the publication of the FRBEIS, conservation advocates in Montana 
realized that they would need to take their fight to higher levels of governance in order for the 
mining threat to be resolved. Perhaps the loudest voice in this group of advocates was the 
administration of Glacier National Park (GNP). GNP administrators were becoming increasingly 
worried about the coal mining issue and, bolstered by their alignment with all of the other 
international Flathead conservation groups, stepped in and sought the aid of former 
Representative Baucus (Sax and Keiter 1987, 239). Park administrators asked him to urge the US 
State Department to seek a referral to the International Joint Commission (IJC) in relation to the 
issue. Somewhat surprisingly, this strategy worked.  
In early 1985, the national governments of the US and Canada agreed to enter into an 
International Joint Commission (IJC) referral process under Article VII of the Boundary Water 
Treaty (BWT) (Ross 1990, 228). The IJC is both an instrument through which the two 
governments can formally communicate and coordinate as well as an independent investigative 
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body that can be called upon to gather information and make non-binding recommendations 
when the two countries cannot agree on their own in regards to a boundary water issue 
(Heinmiller 2008, 1503). For the IJC to get involved, both countries must agree to enter into an 
IJC referral process. This mutual decision initiates a formal study process that the IJC oversees, 
which culminates in the publication of a report with conclusions as to whether or not the actions 
of either country would violate the BWT.  
There are multiple contradictory answers to the question of why the Canadian 
government would agree to a referral process in this instance, i.e. an upstream-downstream 
situation where they did not seem to have much to gain by including the US in their decision-
making process. Whether Canada entered into the agreement as a result of the heavy pressure 
from the US State Department or simply because the decision makers in Ottawa, Canada’s 
capital city, did not expect the results of the referral process to come out against the mines is 
unclear (Flathead Basin Commission 1983 and Thompson and Thomas 2007, 289). Regardless, 
both nations agreed to enter into an IJC referral in 1985 to determine whether or not the impacts 
of the proposed Flathead coal mines would violate the BWT. The referral was also designed to 
assist the two governments in ensuring that, in the language of Article IV of the BWT, “[the 
waters in question] shall not be polluted on either side [of the border] to the injury of health or 
property on the other.” To accomplish these tasks, the IJC established the Flathead River 
International Study Board (FRISB) in 1988.  
The FRISB technical team, consisting of US and Canadian experts (Kalispell Weekly 
1985), oversaw a study including data collection on an array of relevant issues; water quality and 
quantity, air quality, and the status of several key fisheries (Ross 1990, 229). Key to the work of 
the team was maintaining a level of impartiality so that both sides felt the process was conducted 
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fairly. In support of this goal, an equal number of US and Canadian scientists took part in the 
research process, each country held three public meetings during the study, and the final 
assessments of data used a framework that assumed both optimal and adverse scenarios for the 
success of the proposed mine’s safety measures (Flathead River International Study Board 1988, 
3-5). The team made another important design decision in recognition of the challenges of data 
collection in such a remote and complicated landscape. This decision was to include, in the final 
assessment, conclusions informed by inferences made on the experiences of similar types of 
mines in the neighboring Elk River basin (ibid.). This proved crucial because one of the 
supposedly representative coal mines in the Elk River basin suffered catastrophic failures of two 
settling ponds as a result of a significant snow melt event during one of the research visits to the 
area by the FRISB research scientists (Holt 1986, 7). Though not directly mentioned in the final 
report, this experience is assumed to have influenced the final assessments of the mine’s viability 
(Pers. Comm. Experts #1 and #7, 2018). 
The findings from FRISB’s studies, published in December of 1988, were mixed in their 
review of the potential impacts of coal mining in the Flathead basin. For instance, the report 
concluded that coal mining would not significantly impact water quantity at the international 
boundary in either an optimal or adverse case (Flathead River International Study Board 1988, 
21). On the topic of water quality, however, the report’s findings were much more negative. 
Under both adverse and optimal scenarios, the report found that significant deleterious impacts to 
water quality would occur through increased sedimentation, turbidity, increase in water 
temperature, and increased algae growth. Further, the report concluded that, in relation to the 
above mentioned Article IV of the BWT, any coal mine at the proposed site would have a direct 
negative socio-economic impact on the State of Montana’s recreational fishing industry through 
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damage to the spawning grounds of the local Bull Trout (Salvelinus confluentus) population 
(Flathead River International Study Board 1988, 25). In other words, the bull trout population 
that spends most of its life on the Montana side of the basin but that crosses into British 
Columbia to spawn could be damaged by coal mining operations near its Canadian spawning 
grounds. The report also stated that in situations where one side of the border is working hard to 
preserve an area, the other side should consider “alternative-development opportunities” 
(Flathead River International Study Board 1988, 9).  
The FRISB technical team made a series of final recommendations based upon research 
findings, the interpretation of these findings in the context of certain provisions of the BWT, and 
the results of the public outreach process.  
1. To reject the current mine as proposed; 
2. That future, similarly sited, mine proposals should not be approved unless the 
identified negative impacts to the transboundary water quality and the Bull Trout 
fishery were dealt with to a level acceptable to both governments;  
3. That the governments of the appropriate jurisdictions, i.e. BC and Montana, work 
to implement “compatible, equitable, and sustainable development activities and 
management strategies in the upper Flathead River basin” (Flathead River 
International Study Board 1988, 11).  
 
These findings were decisive and “amounted to a complete victory for Montana and Glacier 
National Park” (Sax and Keiter 2006, 296). The BWT was a respected international statute 
however its conclusions are not binding. Nonetheless, BWT conclusions are by far the highest-
level condemnation of the proposed mines to date. Crucially, though, the recommendations made 
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by the IJC were non-binding. Fearing that acceptance of these findings would prove to be 
standard setting, Canada opted not to accept the findings of the IJC report (ibid.). British 
Columbia also refused to engage in talks with Montana in regards to future development in the 
area following the publication of the findings (Sax and Keiter 2006, 297). Still, soon after the 
report was released, the proposal for the mines at Cabin Creek was rescinded. The publicly stated 
reason for this decision was that global coal prices had fallen, making removal of coal from such 
a hard to reach place cost-prohibitive (Soucek 2012, 10). However, some sources say that the 
termination of the proposal was the outcome of the IJC report spotlighting the political risks of 
developing mine proposals in politically complex contexts (Pers. Comm. Experts #1 and #7, 
2018). 
British Columbia Land Use Planning Processes 
 
From 1997 to 2003, there were three significant shifts in the BC land use plan for the 
international Flathead and surrounding areas. The first occurred in 1997 when, following a four 
year planning process, the BC government finalized the Kootenay Boundary Land Use Plan 
(KBLUP) (British Columbia Ministry for Sustainable Resource Management 1997, 3). The four-
year planning process had involved the participation of a range of Canadian stakeholders, 
including local, provincial, and national environmental non-profits (E-NGOs) and government 
officials (Pers. Comm. Expert #2, 2018). Notably, Montana officials made formal requests to be 
involved in the process but were turned down by the BC government (Harris et al. 2001, 16 and 
Racicot 1993 and Sexton 2010, 3). For conservationists and local resource users involved in the 
planning process, one of the primary emphases of this effort was securing greater protections for 
land in the Flathead. At times this brought people together but there was also significant 
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disagreement over how stringent those protections should be. Most local hunters and outfitters, 
along with some conservationists, wanted protections similar to the level of National Forests in 
the US (Pers. Comm. Experts #2, #5, and #9, 2018). That level of protection would allow them 
to continue using the land in ways that they had historically. Another group, composed mostly of 
conservationists, was more interested in expanding Waterton Lakes National Park across the 
continental divide and into BC, where the Akamina-Kishinena Provincial Protected Area 
(AKPPA) is. Establishing the AKPPA, and ideally a larger area, as a national park would have 
been a significant accomplishment but would also have removed historic uses from that parcel of 
land. This divisive topic caused a rift between those who supported protecting the international 
Flathead, in large part down the local-provincial/national lines (Pers. Comm. Expert #5, 2018). 
Owing to the hard work of some crucial individuals, who were able to bridge this divide, 
the coalition of those in favor of protection was able to come together to successfully advocate 
for a land use plan that would increase connectivity in the basin and prioritize strengthening 
protections for the AKPPA area (Pers. Comm. Expert #5, 2018). Unfortunately, when this plan 
was submitted to the provincial government in Victoria, BC, the government voted not to include 
the increased protections and instead decided to designate the Flathead Valley as part of a Coal 
Enhanced Resource Development Zone (ERDZ) (British Columbia Ministry for Sustainable 
Resource Management 1997 and Pers. Comm. Experts #5 and #6, 2018). The report from the 
Ministry of Sustainable Resources (1997, 8) notes that:  
The Coal ERDZ designation signifies an assurance of long-term security of access and 
tenures to these lands for coal mining exploration and development purposes, 
contributing to investor confidence and general coal industry viability. Within the Coal 
ERDZs it is recognized that ecosystem function may be temporarily compromised by 
coal exploration, development, production, or use activities on these lands. 
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To Montana stakeholders, Canadian E-NGOs, and local supporters of historic uses, such as 
hunting and outfitting, this designation was a significant blow (Locke and McKinney 2013, 201). 
For Montana stakeholders specifically, some of whom had spent the previous four years working 
to get a formal voice in the process, this decision signaled that the 1988 IJC referral decision had 
not meant the end of the fight for the environmental health of the Flathead (Harris et al. 2001, 
11).  
The second shift in land use planning came following BC’s adoption of the KBLUP.  
Partially in response to the first shift, several Canadian and US E-NGO’s, including Canadian 
Parks and Wilderness Society – BC Chapter (CPAWS) and the National Parks Conservation 
Association joined together and started a transboundary coalition known as Flathead Wild (Pers. 
Comm. Expert #9, 2018). The most significant purpose of this coalition was to increase 
Canadian public awareness of the implications of the KBLUP for the future of the international 
Flathead’s environmental health. This was an important objective to those dedicated to 
protecting the Flathead because few residents of BC were familiar with the basin and river due to 
their seclusion. Consequently, in 2001, the FW public awareness campaign focused on 
increasing broader provincial awareness of the Flathead. This effort proved successful when the 
BC government gave in to mounting pressure and agreed to add greater protections to the 
Flathead and other surrounding basins (Locke and McKinney 2013 and Sexton 2010).  
These increased protections came in the form of a Wildlife Management Area (WMA) 
designation on the area, which was based on the stakeholder recommendations that had been 
made during the previous KBLUP (Sexton 2010, 4). Although a welcome addition, the WMA 
protections still fell short of what some conservationists wanted, which was expansion of 
Waterton Lakes National Park into BC or to develop an expanded International Conservation 
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Reserve across the Montana /BC border (Locke and McKinney 2013 and Pers. Comm. Experts 
#5 and #7, 2018). Still, conservation advocates generally saw it as an important step in the right 
direction (Locke and McKinney 2013). Their satisfaction, however, was to be short-lived. Later 
in 2003, as a new government was coming into power in BC, the right to host the 2010 Winter 
Olympics was awarded to Vancouver (BBC 2003). These two events together pushed the official 
BC stance on coal mining in the international Flathead and surrounding areas back towards an 
industry friendly stance.  
Following an election in 2001, the BC Liberal Party, led by Gordon Campbell, formed a 
new majority government. Not only was this new government more supportive of the BC-coal 
industry, they also had to prepare for a massive and costly international sporting event (Sexton 
2010, 4). Given the costs that would be associated in organizing and putting on the Olympics, the 
government looked to coal extraction in southeast BC, including the Flathead, as a crucial 
revenue generator (Soucek 2012, 67 and Sax and Keiter 2006, 287). The Liberals moved quickly 
to eliminate the short-lived WMA and begin a new comprehensive land use planning process 
(Locke and McKinney 2013, 204 and Pers. Comm. Expert #9, 2018). This new plan was called 
the Southern Rocky Mountain Management Plan (SRMMP). The process of writing it took place 
quickly during 2003.  
Even before the plan was finished, the emphasis on coal extraction for southeastern BC 
was evident. An assessment of the environmental impacts of coal mining on southeast BC 
completed by a private firm during the SRMMP planning process noted that although the area 
had earlier been identified as a WMA, “…the current government determined that additional 
resource management direction was required to adequately balance social, economic, and 
environmental values” (emphasis added) (Triton Environmental Consultants LTD 2002, 6). In 
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other words, the assessment openly stated that the new regime had brought back the coal-friendly 
perspective to land use decision making. 
Indeed, before the end of 2003, the planning process had yielded a plan that was not only 
a return to mining industry-friendly land use designations but was even more aggressive in 
spurring mining than the KBLUP. The SRMMP adopted a two-zone system with respect to 
mining access rights. Explained simply, this meant that land was either open to mining or not 
open to mining. What this amounted to on the map was that almost all of the land within the 
planning area, hundreds of thousands of acres, was open to mining. The only areas that were not 
were the small pockets of privately owned land and AKPP (British Columbia Ministry for 
Sustainable Resource Management 2003, 18). In the years following this new plan’s 
implementation, proposals to conduct both coal mining and coal bed methane extraction were 
formalized. This ramping up of mining activities was the clearest threat to the health of the 
international Flathead since the rescinding of the Cabin Creek proposal following the IJC referral 
findings in 1988. In response, the efforts, on both sides of the border, to protect the river and 
basin also kicked into their highest gear since the late 1980’s. As the stakes for both sides of this 
conflict became higher, final resolution of the issue also approached.   
Intersection of Winter Olympics, UNESCO Study, and MOU 
	
As briefly described above, in 2003, the International Olympic Committee chose 
Vancouver, BC as the host site for the 2010 winter games (BBC 2003). Looking for ways to 
support financing the event, the BC government considered its most lucrative natural resource: 
coal (Soucek 2012, 67). The primary source of coal in BC is in the southeastern corner of the 
province, which includes the Canadian Flathead basin. Though mining had gone on for decades 
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in nearby basins, the Flathead had yet to be mined. The Olympics announcement provided the 
ideal motivation to change that (Sax and Keiter 2006, 287). In the years that followed, as the 
pressure surrounding putting on the Olympics mounted so too did the pressure to mine in the 
Flathead. With this pressure, the profile of the proposed mines in the Flathead also reached new 
heights, drawing international attention.  
Much of the international attention stemmed from several efforts by a transboundary 
coalition of environmental non-profits and Montana and US politicians to pressure BC into 
removing mining rights from the Canadian Flathead. As the Olympics neared, these efforts came 
together. One effort involved reaching out to UNESCO in a ploy to apply international pressure 
on the BC government. In the summer of 2009, representatives from Flathead Wild travelled to 
Spain to petition the World Heritage Committee of UNESCO at its annual meeting (Pers. Comm. 
Expert #1, 2018). FW representatives requested that the designation of the Waterton-Glacier 
International Peace Park, which at the time was already both a Biosphere Reserve and World 
Heritage Site, be changed to “in danger” status (UNESCO 2010, 10). The FW representatives 
argued that the risk posed by climate change and local threats, such as mining, demanded this 
change (Tuholske and Foster 2014, 698). At the same time, 53,000 Canadian and U.S. citizens 
signed and submitted a petition asking UNESCO to protect the park from upstream mining 
(ibid). As a result, the World Heritage committee unanimously voted to send an investigative 
team to WGIPP to conduct a formal on-site investigation to assess the validity of these claims 
(Soucek 2012, 14).  
Simultaneously, there was growing pressure on Canadian Provincial and National 
governments to protect the Flathead from mining. This pressure came via multiple avenues. 
From the US, following appeals from (then) Senator Max Baucus (who was at that point in the 
51 
	
powerful position of chair of the US Senate Finance Committee), Senator Jon Tester, and (then) 
Governor Brian Schweitzer, officials at the US State Department began seriously discussing the 
topic with their counterparts in Ottawa. At the provincial level, FW organized a strategic public 
awareness campaign to garner significant media attention and rally public support (Locke and 
McKinney 2013, 203). As the Olympics approached, immense pressure built on BC to make a 
decision about the Flathead. This pressure put the government in a tough place because in the 
run-up to the Olympics they were working hard to publicize BC’s scenic mountain settings and 
natural mystique (Locke and McKinney 2013, 203). The potential embarrassment of anti-coal 
mining media attention taking the spotlight away from the environmentally friendly message 
eventually forced the BC government to give in and re-open talks with Montana officials in 
regards to the future of the Flathead. These talks centered on updating a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) that BC and Montana had begun developing in 2003 (Soucek 2012, 16). 
Negotiations in 2003 to formalize the MOU were never completed, but the document proved to 
be the best starting point in 2010 for opening talks regarding conservation of the shared Flathead 
environment (Sexton 2010, 7). The heightened pressure put on BC in the final run-up to the 
Olympics proved to be a tipping point and a groundbreaking agreement was reached between the 
two parties as a result.  
In the final hours before the Olympic opening ceremony, BC announced the retirement of 
all oil and coal leases in the Flathead Basin (Locke and McKinney 2013, 203). Days later, BC 
and Montana signed an MOU stating Montana would do the same south of the border and that 
the two jurisdictions would improve their working relationship in the management of the 
transboundary environment (The Province of British Columbia and the State of Montana 2010). 
Though the MOU was a nonbinding agreement, it spurred real change. Less than four years later, 
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both the BC and US governments had passed binding legislation protecting the international 
Flathead basin by forever removing all mining rights from the basin. Further, in support of this, 
the land leases still held on both sides of the border by energy companies were bought out by 
environmental non-profits. These agreements represented a tremendous achievement for all 
parties with a stake in protecting the international Flathead. 
Summary 
	 	
 This chapter presented an assessment of the four major historical events identified as 
being the most influential through my analysis. Over the course of the events, which span the 40-
year timeline, the role of a diverse array of institutions is described. In the events of the 1970s, 
the actions of an emergent river advocacy group motivated politicians, scientists, and local 
community members to question the initial proposal for a coal mine on the BC side of the basin. 
In the mid- to late-1980’s, a rarely activated function of an international conflict resolution body, 
the IJC referral process, was triggered. This resulted in an important, high-level, scientific study 
being conducted on the international Flathead. Around the turn of the century, the back-and-forth 
of two significant land use planning processes in BC showed that resolution of the mining issue 
remained an issue most clearly impacted by decision makers in the province instead of by actors 
in Montana. Finally, in the events leading up to the signing of the MOU in 2010, the role of 
international actors, such as UNESCO and the Olympic games, came into focus as international 
public opinion forced the BC government to give ground on their Flathead mining stance.  
Revealed in the progression of the 40-year effort to confront the threat of coal mining, is 
the importance of the growth of the networks of river advocacy and conservation actors involved 
in the work. The scientists, E-NGOs, politicians, and engaged citizens who were active in 
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opposing mining slowly grew closer and closer to one another over the 40 years as their work 
overlapped and became more reliant on the progress of others. For instance, BC’s eventual 
decision to remove mining rights was the culmination of mounting social pressure resulting from 
the FW awareness campaign, the science based decision of UNESCO to determine WGIPP was 
“in danger,” and the hard work of MT and US politicians to sway BC and Canadian politicians 
opinions. Each of those factors was tied to work that had been going on for decades before. 
Further, the final removal of mining rights most likely would not have occurred without all of 
them coming together at once. The following chapter will question the functions of 
environmental governance over this timeline to assess the role of adaptive governance in each of 
these outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 5: ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS 
 
	
This chapter responds to the question of whether or not the previously discussed four key 
historic events had any relation to supporting, enhancing, and/or facilitating the emergence of 
AG in the international Flathead. There is no doubt that there have been several remarkable 
conservation victories for those involved in protecting the international Flathead from coal 
mining. Some of the victories stand out in terms of the unusual means by which they came to 
fruition. The goal of Chapter 5 is to establish whether or not those victories, or environmental 
governance outcomes, constituted adaptations to the EGC at the time. EGC’s, i.e., the system of 
environmental governance of a specific time and place, are complex due to the many layers of 
vertical and horizontal scalar interactions that factor into decision-making processes. For 
instance, interactions between international and local stakeholders or amongst international 
stakeholders can be complex. Together, these interactions can create conditions in which AG can 
emerge. The question is if they did in this instance. The first section of the chapter presents the 
results of RQ2 and the next presents the results of RQ2a.  
Were the Criteria Necessary for AG to Emerge Met? 
	
Were the criteria necessary for AG to emerge, as identified by Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 
(2003) and described by Chaffin, Gosnell, and Cosens (2014), present in the environmental 
governance context of the international Flathead when any of the four most influential events 
occurred? Answering this question was a complicated process. The variety of institutions, which 
included organizations, laws, and governing bodies, that were at play in the environmental 
governance context (EGC) present surrounding each of the four most influential events is vast. 
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Fully understanding how they related to each other and how those relations impacted outcomes is 
extremely difficult and, perhaps, impossible. This is especially true given the historic timeline of 
these events and that these institutions interacted horizontally, vertically, and diagonally across 
scales with each other. In order for an analysis to produce results that offered any clarity, some 
amount of simplification of the EGC being questioned had to happen. Fortunately, the majority 
of key organizations, laws, and governing bodies that were relevant to the four key events were 
created before 1974 and still exist today. Therefore, if the structure and interaction of those 
institutions in relation to AG could be established, the EGC they created could be assumed static 
between events. Within this assumption there is understanding that new influential institutions 
frequently emerged from 1974-2014. Where relevant, discussion of the impact of these emergent 
institutions on the EGC is included.  
In order to determine this, I needed to learn how the key institutions going into the events 
of 1974 functioned internally and how they interacted with one another. I approached this 
process with two steps. First, as described in the Content Analysis section of Chapter 3, I 
generated a table of working definitions of each criteria and a list of key terms associated with 
them. This is shown below as Table 3.  
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Table 3: Criteria Necessary for the Emergence of AG 
 
By organizing the criteria in this manner, I was more easily able to operationalize each of 
the criteria as thematic codes for use in analysis of documents relating to the interactions and 
structure of relevant institutions existing going into 1974. These institutions are presented below, 
Table 4, and organized by Type of Institution and Scale of Governance. I populated this table 
with the key institutions that existed in 1974 before news of the mine proposal broke and, which 
were also present for the entire duration of the timeline. For instance, the non-profit coalition 
Flathead Wild is not in the table because, though influential, it did not come into being until the 
Criteria Definition Key Terms
Analytic Deliberation
"Well-structured dialogue involving 
scientists, resource users, and interested 
publics, and informed by analysis of key 
information about environmental and 
human-environmental systems" (Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1910).
provides trust, builds social 
capital, provides information, 
involves interested parties, 
informed discussion of rules, 
horizontal and vertical 
transfer of information
Nested Governance
"Multiple, overlapping levels of control 
with one level of either control or strong 
coordination at the scale of the particular 
social-ecological system" (Cosens 2005, 
256)
hierarchy of institutions, 
complex, redundant, layered, 
diverse scales of authority, 
decentralized decision making
Mixed Institutional 
Types
"Hierarchies, markets,  and community 
self-governance (etc.) that employ a 
variety of decision rules to change 
incentives, increase information, monitor 
use, and induce compliance"  (Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1910).
market and state based, 
diverse, flexible, bridging 
institutions
Institutional designs 
that facilitate 
experimentation, 
learning, and change
Institutional designs that draw "on various 
knowledge systems and experiences for 
the development of a common 
understanding and policies" (Folke et al. 
2005, 441)
enabling legislation, 
generating information, 
science, public involvement, 
knowledge systems
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2000’s. Once populated, this table did a good job of visualizing the complexity of the cross-scale 
interactions that make up environmental governance.  
 
Table 4: Institutions Relevant to International Flathead Governance Going into 1974 
 
The next step involved the use of the thematic codes presented in Table 3, to analyze 
whether or not the structure and interactions of the institutions presented in Table 4 met the 
criteria necessary for AG to emerge. To show how this complicated process worked, I generated 
an example analysis. For this example, I selected four key institutions, bolded in Table 4, which, 
together, represent each scale of governance and type of institution. The results of the analysis 
are shown below in Table 5. The analysis in the table describes how each institution relates to 
each criteria and then how the institutions, collectively, relate to one another and create an 
environmental governance context that has certain characteristics. These data were generated by 
use of the content analysis methodology on historic data of the structure and actions of these 
institutions only in relation to environmental governance of the international Flathead over the 
past 40 years. For example, my analysis of the BC government in this instance only involved 
Type of Institution
Government Land Agency Law/Act/Treaty
E-NGO's and 
organizations
Interested 
Public Scientific
International
US/Canada Border, 
Boundary Waters 
Treaty UN
Scale of 
Governance National US and Canada
US NPS (GNP), 
USFS (FNF), Parks 
Canada (WNP) WSRA and ESA
CPAWS and 
NPCA
Tribal
CSKT and 
Ktunaxa
State/Province
British 
Columbia and 
Montana
MT DNRC, MT 
FWP, BC CL, and 
BC MEM
MWA and 
BCWF
UMT and 
UBC
Local
Fernie, 
Kalispell, etc.
Fernie Rod and 
Gun Club and 
Kalispell Chamber 
of Commerce
Historic User 
Groups 
(Hunters, 
Recreaters, 
Loggers)
Flathead 
Biological 
Station
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analysis of the structure and actions of the BC government that related to the governance of the 
international Flathead over the 40 year timeline. Though less descriptive than would have been 
ideal, the analysis offered below in Table 5 is an attempt to visualize the functions of a complex 
system.  
Similar to the results shown in Table 5, the results of the broader analysis of the 
institutions present going into 1974 found that the four criteria necessary for AG to emerge were 
not met at that point. This was specifically due to a lack of analytic deliberation and mixed 
institutional types. This conclusion meant that further analysis was needed to determine if any 
future EGCs met the four criteria. Though not presented in a table, this analysis occurred for the 
environmental governance context that existed in 1977. By then, multiple key institutions, 
mainly the Flathead Coalition, had entered the broader EGC. This analysis again used the 
thematic codes presented in Table 3 to determine whether the structure and actions of these new 
institutions were sufficient additions to qualify the EGC as meeting all four criteria.  
This analysis showed that the Flathead Coalition provided much needed diversity to the 
institutional types present in the baseline EGC. Not only was the coalition, as a broad based 
citizens’ organization, a new type of institution for the EGC, it also brought a diverse array of 
other groups into the governing equation. Perhaps most notably, the inclusion of multiple 
chambers of commerce in the Flathead Coalition lent a certain amount of market-based influence 
to its functions. The Flathead Coalition also increased the level of analytic deliberation that could 
take place within the broader EGC. 
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Table 5: Relation of Representative Institutions to AG Criteria  
 
Analytic Deliberation Nested Governance Mixed Inst. Types Inst. Design for Change…
BC Gov't
Can contribute but mostly through 
significant formal triggered 
process (LUPP), historic industry 
friendly stance on extraction puts 
scientific processes into question, 
majority parties have considerable 
control over shape of 
environmental governance 
decision-making processes
Has formal decision-making 
authoriy at the provincial level and 
at some local government levels, 
mostly centralized decision-
making but authority can be 
shared through LUPPs or other 
mechanisms
Democratically elected 
governing body with 
formal reach at 
pronvincial and local 
levels, actions are strongly 
influenced by choices of 
majority government
Structures exist within BC land 
use law for learning, 
experimentation, and change but 
generally only through triggered 
processes that can be highly 
politicized
Glacier 
National 
Park
Can contribute but mostly  
through significant formal triggered  
process (NEPA), can only 
generate information about land 
within the park, historically pro-
conservation stance on 
transboundary Flathead 
environmental governance issues
Has formal decision-making 
authoriy on issues at the park 
level, only formally involved with 
decisions about park land but can 
influence other processes through 
social license 
Formally structured 
"branch" of federal 
agency, oversees public 
processes through rules 
agreed upon at federal 
level (NEPA), actions are 
somewhat influenced by 
current government
Structures exist within operating 
language for learning, 
experimentation, and change but 
these processes often only 
occur when triggered, can be 
influenced by current 
governments, and are designed 
to proceed slowly with 
transparency as a key outcome
Boundary 
Waters 
Treaty
Can contribute but exclusively 
through IJC referral process, very 
effective but very hard to trigger, 
can only generate information 
related to boundary waters, 
attempts to be impartial impacted 
by broader political forces
Has no direct decision-making 
authority but can make formal, 
non-binding, reccomendations, 
designed to represent both 
nations equally, only formally 
involved in processes at the level 
of waters (or some impacts) that 
cross the border but has reach to 
other levels through social license
Treaty agreed upon and 
upheld jointly by the US 
and Great Britain/Canada 
since 1909, generally not 
influenced by current 
governments but triggered 
actions can be impacted 
by current governments 
Structures exist for learning, 
experimentation, and change but 
only engaged through formally 
triggered mutually-agreed upon 
processes, these can generate 
formal reports but not 
necessarily binding agreements
Fernie Rod 
and Gun 
Club
Can contribute on small scale, 
infrastructure has slowly grown 
more formal, speaks for smaller 
group/place, does not internally 
generate scientific information, 
supports land designations that 
protect historic uses, i.e. not 
national parks
Does not have formal decision-
making authority, involved mostly 
at local level but is explicitly 
organized to influence local 
governance in regards to certain 
selected issues
Non-governmental 
rganization born from 
historic outdoor user 
groups seeing need for 
more formal voice in local 
governance, actions can 
be influenced by broader 
market forces  
Not designed to learn, 
experiment, or change itself so 
much as designed to represent 
the opinions of locals, which 
may change as a result of 
learning or experimentation
Collectively 
Potential existed for these 
institutions to partake in AD but 
only under very specific 
circumstances, which indeed 
proved to be uncommon. Given 
that these institutions did not enter 
into AD until other key institutions 
entered the EGC, they cannot be 
said to have reached AD. 
In certain situations, i.e. possible 
pollution in the NF resulting from 
coal mining, the relationship 
between these institutions does 
represent  nested governance. 
Each institution represents a 
different level and has, at least, 
some authority to work to 
influence decision-making 
processes both at and outside of 
their level. 
These institutions do 
represent a mixture of 
institutional types but too 
many of them are directly 
tied to formal 
governments for them to 
be sufficiently mixed. 
Most notably, this group 
lacks market-based 
institutions and a broader 
array of representation of 
local voices.  
These institutions do each have 
some level of intentional design 
to facilitate learning, 
experimentation, and change. 
The problem is that, for most of 
them, those processes only 
occur at certain specific times 
and political goals can restrict 
outcomes. That said, when 
triggered, these institutions are 
sufficiently designed to generate 
new information and respond to 
that information.
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By including so many voices in the process, including the scientific community 
eventually, the coalition provided information, improved trust amongst interested public groups, 
and built social capital. The coalition also contributed to the nesting of governance within the 
system as well as to the capacity of the involved institutions to experiment, learn, and change. 
The two areas where the previously described baseline set of institutions lacked in terms of 
adaptive potential though were Mixed Institutional Types and Analytic Deliberation. The 
Flathead Coalition improved both of these for the overall EGC. In fact, the emergence of the 
Flathead Coalition brought the state of the baseline EGC to a point where adaptive governance 
outcomes were possible. This finding meant that analyses of whether or not the remaining key 
events were adaptive could begin.  
Were the Outcomes of the Key Events Adaptive?  
	
The process for answering this question looked similar to the process for answering RQ2, 
as detailed in the previous section. The five conditions that AG should create, according to the 
AG framework, were operationalized as thematic codes for use in content analysis of the 
outcomes of the key events that came after 1977. To simplify use of these concepts, Table 4 was 
generated using the original definitions of the concepts from Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003). 
Taken together, these five concepts of what AG should do help to explain how AG 
environmental governance outcomes constitute adaptations to shifting environmental governance 
conditions. When the institutions interacting in an environmental governance context (ECG) are 
engaged in these five aspects, the governance outcomes that come out of those interactions 
constitute adaptations, or co-evolutions, to shifting conditions, such as changing resource use.  
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Table 6: What AG Should Do for Environmental Governance Processes 
 
 These five concepts, and their associated key terms and ideas, were used as thematic 
codes in content analysis of the key events that occurred following the EGC in 1977 meeting of 
the criteria necessary for AG to emerge. The first analyses presented in the next section were of 
governance outcomes that occurred in 1977 and 1983 as a direct result of the earlier key events. 
AG should Definition Key Terms/Ideas
Provide 
Information (PO)
Provide "good, trustworthy information about stocks, 
flows, and processes within the resource systems 
being governed, as well as about the human-
environment interactions affecting those systems. This 
information must be congruent in scale with 
environmental events and decisions" (Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern 2003, 1908). 
science and local knowledge, 
not highly aggregated, meets 
decision makers' needs, high 
scientific standards, not too 
much at once
Deal with Conflict 
(DC)
"People bring varying perspectives, interests, and 
fundamental philosophies to problems of 
environmental governance, and their conflicts, if they 
do not escalate to the point of dysfunction, can spark 
learning and change" (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 
2003, 1909).
sharp differences in power 
and values inherent, conflict 
resolution, can drive 
insitutional design choices, 
equitable and shared 
outcomes
Induce Rule 
Compliance (IRC)
"Effective governance requires that the rules of 
resource use are generally followed, with reasonable 
standards for tolerating modest violations" (Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1909).
community based insitutions, 
informal strategies, social 
sanctions, fines, science 
based, rules agreed upon, 
participant commitment
Provide 
Infrastructure 
(PF)
Physical and institutional "infrastructure, including 
technology, determines the degree to which a 
commons can be exploited, the extent to which 
waste can be reduced in resource use, and the 
degree to which resource conditions and the 
behavior of human users can be effectively 
monitored" (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1909).
links between local and 
global, often ignored, effective 
communication, research, 
social capital, rules, helps 
coordinate
Be Prepared for 
Change (BPC)
"Institutions must be designed to allow for adaptation 
because some current understanding is likely to be 
wrong, the required scale of organization can shift, 
and biophysical and social systems change" (Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1909).
fixed rules likely to fail, low 
probablity and high 
consequence changes, can be 
suboptimal in short run but 
prove wiser in long run, less 
top-down control
62 
	
This approach is repeated for the outcomes of the key events in the following decades. The 
results of these analyses are presented in a series of simple tables that accompany brief 
justifications of the determinations. Included within these descriptions is a final conclusion as to 
whether or not the outcome of the key event being analyzed was adaptive. I will begin with the 
outcomes resulting from the key events of the mid-1970’s; the FRBEIS and the FBC. 
FRBEIS and FBC 
	
FRBEIS was designed with significant input from local resource users. The study itself 
utilized sound science to generate a large volume of data that was publicly available upon 
publication. Together, these two factors clearly qualify the FRBEIS as an outcome that provided 
information for future environmental governance processes in the international Flathead. Less 
clear is whether or not the FRBEIS can be said to have dealt with conflict. This answer is 
complicated because determining exactly what the conflict was at that time is complex. If the 
conflict were only between those who wanted to mine coal in the BC side of the Flathead Basin 
and those who did not, then the FRBEIS cannot be said to have directly dealt with any conflict. 
This is because the threat of coal mining persisted long after the early 1980’s. On the other hand, 
the design of the study helped build social trust, the findings put added pressure on the BC 
government to resist approving the mine, and the Flathead Basin Commission was created as a 
result of the study. Each of these factors is a key part of the eventual resolution of this conflict. 
As a result, the study is determined to have dealt with conflict. 
The findings of the FRBEIS did help induce rule compliance as the BC government 
agreed to add more stringent, data driven conditions to the approval of the mining permit that 
Sage Creek was pursuing. The findings also helped strengthen the scientific foundations upon 
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which the resource use rules for the US side of the Flathead River system were based.  The 
FRBEIS provided infrastructure to governance efforts of the system as well. During the five 
years of the study, physical and technological infrastructure in the form of transportation, work 
spaces, and scientific instruments were provided to those involved. The scale of this 
infrastructure meant that the study was by far the largest ever conducted on the international 
Flathead ecosystem. Another important point is that the study provided a significant amount of 
institutional infrastructure to the governance context in the form of research, social capital, and a 
structure for communication between the levels of institutions involved. Further, though much of 
the infrastructure discussed here only existed for the duration of the study, the FBC emerging as 
a result of the study’s findings means that a significant amount of institutional infrastructure 
persisted. Finally, the design and findings of the FRBEIS helped the broader EGC to be prepared 
for change because the design of the study helped build local trust between scientists and 
resource users. Finally, the results of the study were by far the most complete set of data on the 
condition of the Flathead River basin that had ever been collected. Having up-to-date 
information to act as a baseline in the future is crucial to the capacity of those involved in 
resource governance to respond to change.  
The FBC was, in large part, created so that there would be a quasi-governmental body 
dedicated to keeping up-to-date on the condition of, and threats to, the water quality in the 
Flathead. The commission also did a relatively good job of representing local interests by having 
members appointed by local governmental and non-governmental bodies. In doing so, as a 
publicly funded body, the commission provided a large amount of data that was informed by 
both scientific research and local knowledge. Similarly to the FRBEIS, saying whether or not the 
FBC dealt with conflict is a little more challenging. As in the case of FRBEIS, judging whether 
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or not the FBC dealt with conflict effectively is more challenging. The FBC did not deal with the 
primary conflict between those in support of coal mining and those against it. Nevertheless, the 
actions of the FBC in future years helped resolve numerous conflicts along the way to the final 
resolution of the mining issue. More clearly, by acting as a consistently funded government body 
solely dedicated to protecting the water quality of the Flathead system, the FBC helped to induce 
rule compliance by ensuring that breaking the rules surrounding resource use in the system 
would be more difficult. The FBC provided a significant amount of institutional infrastructure 
through its design and functions.  
This outcome was especially true because creation of the commission meant that there 
was now a group dedicated to the environmental quality of the Flathead and made up of multi-
level stakeholders, including an international representative. That was an invaluable addition to 
the EGC as well as a message to those in support of coal mining in the basin; the days of rumors 
about proposed coal mines in BC slowly trickling into Montana were over. The FBC also 
provided some physical and technological infrastructure in the form of work space, occasional 
transportation, and office technology. Finally, the FBC did not help the broader EGC to be 
prepared for change because of insufficient involvement of BC officials in FBC functions. This 
lack of inclusion meant that any positive outcomes of work done by the FBC would be one-
sided. This imbalance would hold back the broader EGC from being better prepared for change. 
In conclusion, both of these outcomes qualify for the five variables of the framework sufficiently 
for them to be considered adaptive. Though neither outcome did this perfectly, especially in 
terms of bridging the gap with those working on these issues in BC, they added such significant 
amounts of information and institutional infrastructure to the broader EGC that they each 
constituted adaptations to the system.  
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PI	 DC	 IRC	 PR	 BPC	
FRBEIS	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	
FBC	 x	 x	 x	 x	
	Table 7: AG Analysis of 1st Key Event Outcomes 
IJC REFERRAL  
	
  The results of the IJC referral process, published in 1988, provided a large amount of 
information to the governing context. Included in the findings of the study were results from 
research on water quality, air quality, local economics, and other topics. All of these results 
became publicly available upon publication. Due to the basin-scale design of the studies, the 
information provided was also congruent with the scale of the environmental events and 
decisions in question. This congruency meant that the information produced by the referral 
process was well suited to increasing understanding of the issues at a basin-scale. If the 
information had been produced at a BC or MT basin-scale, the data could have perpetuated the 
idea of the riverine ecosystem as governable without transboundary collaboration. Another result 
of the finalization of the IJC referral was that the conflict over the proposed mine somewhat 
subsided for close to 15 years. However, this outcome cannot be categorized as dealing with 
conflict. For instance, the BC government resisted accepting the findings of the study and shied 
away from future collaboration with Montana and US officials for years going forward. This was 
most clearly embodied by the BC government resisting offers by the MT government to take part 
in the BC-LUPPs around the turn of the century (Sexton 2010). Dealing with the conflict at that 
time would have meant Canadian acceptance of the findings and an end of the mining threat. For 
the next variable, the referral findings did induce a slightly higher level of rule compliance. Once 
the findings were public, specifically the finding that proceeding with the coal mine as planned 
would have violated the BWT, the Cabin ck. proposal was rescinded. Though there is 
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disagreement over exactly why the proposal was rescinded, the public awareness of the issue 
would have made avoiding the study’s results difficult. Still, by never accepting the findings, the 
Canadian government ensured that they were not technically beholden to the recommendations. 
The full three-year study process, which involved scientists spending a significant 
amount of time in the field, provided varying levels of infrastructure to the governing context at 
that time. A large amount of communications and transportation infrastructure went into 
supporting these efforts. There was also some technological infrastructure in the form of 
scientific instruments used in this work. More importantly, there was a significant amount of 
institutional infrastructure created through this work. All of the structure of the IJC referral 
process came into play through these studies. For those three years, all the important work being 
done in support of those efforts was happening through an internationally agreed upon set of 
multilevel rules. Following this internal infrastructure was crucial because it meant that the final 
results of the studies were trustworthy. As explained previously, these studies, and their findings, 
were the most internationally significant works to have been done on this topic at that point. 
Unfortunately, the final results of the process cannot be said to have better prepared the system 
for change. This is because the Canadian and BC governments came away from the process 
feeling as though they had not been treated fairly. The Canadian government shied away from 
IJC referrals following the 1988 findings. The BC government also moved forward on working 
to incentivize coal extraction projects and refused to work with Montana officials on anything 
related to the international Flathead. These shifts away from collaboration, in fact, decreased the 
capacity of the EGC to respond to change in the following years. As a result, the IJC referral 
results does not constitute an adaptive outcome. 
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PO	 DC	 IRC	 PF	 BPC	
IJC	Referral	 x	
	
x	 x	
	Table 8: AG Analysis of 2nd Key Event Outcome 
	
BCLUPPs  
 
 The two major land use planning processes that took place in BC around the turn of the 
century provided information to the broader environmental governance context. This was 
especially true for the KBLUP because of the diversity of parties that were involved in the 
discussions during the planning process. Multiple interview subjects who were involved in the 
KBLUP process noted that they gained insight into the perspectives of other stakeholders, whom 
they may have historically been at odds with, as a result of discussions during the planning 
process. Specifically, these discussions brought together resource users from the BC Flathead 
area that are dedicated to historic uses, such as outfitting, with local public land administrators 
and local E-NGO representatives (Pers. Comm. Experts #2 & #3, 2018).  Historically, these 
stakeholders may have been at odds but the information provided by and during the KBLUP 
helped show them that they had common ground and could agree upon some protections that 
could be placed on land within the basin. Unfortunately, much of the information, specifically 
the mutual support for a new WMA in the basin, was not present in the final plans that emerged 
from the planning processes (Pers. Comm. Experts #5 and #6, 2018). Instead, the final plans 
support resource extraction heavy policies for the basin. There is a lack of good scientific 
information supporting these policies. Similar problems were experienced with assessing 
whether or not the BCLUPPs dealt with conflict. There were times during these processes where 
common ground was established. This could have led to plans that protected some areas of the 
basin more and initiated increased resource extraction in other areas. Though not ideal, this 
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discovery of common ground could have been deemed as having dealt with conflict. In the end 
though, the final plans exclusively supported resource extraction over increased conservation. 
The creation of the WMA between the two plans made up for this to a certain extent but the 
future removal of the designation showed the lack of resolution of the conflict. On the other 
hand, the plans did induce rule compliance. This is partially because they greatly simplified the 
process of reaching approval for a coal mine and other extractive operations. For instance, the 
passage of the SRMMP made it so that almost the entirety of the BC Flathead basin was open to 
coal mining. This binary approach to approving resource extraction ensured that there were 
fewer rules for mining companies to follow in the process of proposing and building a mine. 
Still, by removing rules, they could be said to have induced rule compliance.  
 Similar to the ways that the IJC referral study and the FRBEIS study provided 
infrastructure for the duration of their work, the BCLUPPs could also be said to have provided 
infrastructure. A significant amount of time, money, and effort went into building these plans. 
This is especially true for the KBLUP, which, as previously discussed, was a more inclusive and 
open-ended planning process. Though the final outcomes of these plans were suboptimal for 
those interested in protecting the basin, they still provided a significant amount of infrastructure 
for those interested in extracting resources in the basin. Finally, these planning processes did not 
better prepare the broader EGC at the time for change. The plans attempted to make it 
significantly easier for future extractive industry companies to damage the international Flathead 
ecosystem. The outcomes of these plan processes, specifically the removal of the conservation 
goals from the KBLUP by the provincial government, also damaged relationships between actors 
in BC land use planning (Pers. Comm. Experts #2 & #5, 2018). The lack of involvement of 
Montana stakeholders in the planning processes also held these plans back from better preparing 
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for change (Sexton 2010). Taken together, the outcomes of these plans did not constitute 
adaptations to the EGC at the time.  
 
	
PO	 DC	 IRC	 PF	 BPC	
BCLUPPs	
	  
x	 x	
	Table 9: AG Analysis of 3rd Key Event Outcome 
 
BC-MONTANA MOU  
	
 The language of the MOU signed by BC and Montana in early 2011 sets out a number of 
ways that the two parties will work together in the future on international Flathead issues, such 
as environmental assessments and fish and wildlife management. The agreement also calls for 
the proactive sharing of information generated by either actor in regards to international Flathead 
River management. The agreements made by BC and Montana constitutes the providing of 
information. Monitoring whether or not these collaborations happen and information is shared is 
key to this assessment moving forward though. In the short term at least, this agreement also can 
be said to have dealt with conflict. Neither side necessarily got what they wanted out of this deal, 
i.e. BC would have preferred to have coal mining operations active in the basin today and some 
actors in Montana would have preferred to also remove logging rights from the basin (Pers. 
Comm. Expert # 9, 2018). Still, by the time the agreement was reached, BC seemed to be more 
concerned with eliminating the negative press that was being generated about the proposed 
mining. In this sense, the conflict was definitely dealt with. BC also succeeded in retaining the 
rights to extract other resources from the basin, i.e. timber. In this sense, they also got what they 
wanted. In the long term, there is potential for conflict about resource uses in the basin between 
the two parties to re-emerge. This is especially true given that the MOU, itself, is not a binding 
document and BC and Montana do not have the authority to reach binding agreements together. 
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 The MOU induced rule compliance through creating a more effective system of 
governance for the international Flathead. The stronger relationship between the two countries, 
along with increased clarity on allowable resource uses within in the basin, means that rules will 
be more clearly stated. This will make complying with those rules easier. Monitoring whether or 
not there is follow-through on rule compliance will be crucial going forward. The MOU 
provided infrastructure in the form of more clearly stating the relationship between the upstream 
and downstream parties in the basin. There are clearer avenues and more of a structure now for 
the two parties to work on issues related to the international Flathead. Further, the momentum 
built by the MOU helped build institutional infrastructure through the eventual passage of 
binding legislation removing mining rights from the basin.  
Determining whether or not the MOU prepared the international Flathead EGC for 
change is more complicated. In some ways, the MOU clearly did. The MOU spurred the eventual 
removal of mining rights in the basin. This means that the basin will never be polluted or 
degraded by mining activity. This will keep the basin ecosystem healthier and, thus, more 
prepared for sudden changes. Also, the MOU can be said to have improved the relations of those 
involved in BC and Montana governance. A good example of this was (then) BC Prime Minister 
Gordon Campbell and (then) Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer becoming closer friends 
during the run-up to the MOU. These improved relationships certainly better prepare the system 
for change. That said, some of the subjects that I interviewed said that the MOU has given BC 
more flexibility to push forward other extractive practices in the basin, i.e. clear cutting. BC can 
now say, because of the MOU, that they care about the basin ecology. Meanwhile, behind the 
scenes, they can push forward other agendas that may threaten basin ecology. Not enough years 
have passed since the MOU for the determination as to whether or not the agreement better 
71 
	
prepared the EGC for change. As a result, the AG analysis on this event’s outcome is 
incomplete.  
 
	
PO	 DC	 IRC	 PF	 BPC	
MOU	 x	 x	 x	 x	 ?	
Table 10: AG Analysis of 4th Key Event Outcome 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis. Included within the chapter is a brief run-through of 
the study’s findings. This includes description of the results of each of the research questions. 
Following this, there is a discussion of the reasons that such results were found, including an 
analysis of the difficulties experienced in operationalizing the AG framework. Finally, future 
research directions are described.    
Using results generated from content analysis of historic documents and key informant 
interviews, this study identified the four events that, over the past 40 years, were most influential 
in protecting the international Flathead from coal mining. These events were: 1) the emergence 
of the efforts to prevent the coal mine in the mid-1970s and early 1980s; 2) the IJC referral 
process and findings in the late-1980s; 3) the BC land use planning processes around the turn of 
the century; and 4) the UNESCO study findings leaking in the run-up to the 2010 Winter 
Olympics pushing BC to sign an MOU with Montana to ban mining. Following their 
identification, brief but detailed accounts of each of the events were generated through further 
content analysis of collected data. The results of this process were valuable in that they showed 
the value of scientific information generated at the scale of the problem through a less-biased 
process, the potential of putting pressure on politicians by engaging the public through well-
targeted and well-timed campaigns, and the benefits of taking advantage of mechanisms, such as 
the IJC and UNESCO study processes, that exist due to enabling legislation language but need to 
be triggered through creative measures.  
Following the results of that analysis, a framework for AG, which defines the criteria 
necessary for AG to emerge and the conditions that AG should create, was used to analyze each 
73 
	
of the four events. Initially, this process involved confirming whether or not the criteria 
necessary for AG to emerge were ever present over the 40 year timespan. After these criteria 
were identified as having been met in 1977 following the emergence of a new key institution, 
analysis moved to determining whether or not any of the outcomes of the key events met the 
conditions that AG should create and, thus, qualified as adaptations. In total, five separate 
outcomes were analyzed to determine whether or not they were adaptive. Of the five, only one, 
the FRBEIS, met all five conditions. Two other outcomes, the FBC and the MOU, met four of 
the five conditions. Each of these three outcomes represented the creation of an institution that 
created new information, brought important historic institutions together in new ways, and 
helped to make future conservation efforts in the international Flathead easier to achieve. The 
results from the AG framework analysis of the other two events, the BCLUPPs and IJC referral, 
were that only two and three of the conditions were met, respectively. In large part, these 
negative findings were the result of neither outcome dealing with the conflict that the event in 
question was most closely associated with. For example, the US and Canada agreed to enter into 
an IJC referral process to resolve the issue of negative impacts resulting from coal mining in the 
BC side of the basin. Though the IJC referral results are a key contributor to the eventual 
removal of mining rights in the basin, the results cannot be said to have dealt with the conflict 
between the US and Canada over potential mining. For similar reasons, both of these events 
failed to clearly better prepare the EGC of their time for change. Both outcomes augmented the 
division between mining supporters and mining opposition. Increased division does not make 
response to change easier in the future. 
 The international Flathead had a remarkable array of institutions and individuals 
involved in its environmental governance going into 1974. For instance, few transboundary 
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water contexts have the following assets: an internationally relevant national park with UNESCO 
World Heritage Site status (WGIPP); support from an elected official who was willing to 
consistently advocate for the area at the federal level and would rise to significant power in the 
coming decades (Max Baucus); a dynamic nearby research body dedicated to monitoring water 
quality (Flathead Biological Station); and one of the safest international borders in the world 
with a, largely, supported and successful boundary water treaty in place (US-Canada border and 
the Boundary Waters Treaty).  
Each of those institutions are uncommon on their own and for one basin to be governed 
by all of them is remarkable. Yet, all of those institutions together still failed to sufficiently meet 
the four criteria necessary for AG to be able to emerge in 1974. Though the emergence of the 
Flathead Coalition in the coming years would help meet the criteria and set the stage for the 
possible emergence of AG, the real takeaway may be just how hard meeting the four criteria is. 
Another takeaway may also be that either the AG framework or the way the AG framework was 
operationalized in this study was to blame for these findings. Perhaps the framework does not 
adequately account for times when mechanisms such as an Environmental Impact Statement 
exist through enabling legislation but are not triggered, i.e., before the 1977 funding of the 
crucial FRBEIS when the option to fund it existed but had not yet been taken advantage of. 
However, the problem may also have been that the approach taken to measuring the baseline 
EGC did not sufficiently take into account the benefits of interactions that were happening 
between institutions but that were not accounted for in the historical analysis. Past research 
looking for signs of AG in historical accounts have found that networks associated with AG have 
remained elusive (Chaffin et al. 2016). Though this thesis may not be as methodologically 
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refined as past works, the difficulties experienced in past works in identifying AG were 
experienced in this work as well.  
 These problems may also have influenced the results of RQ2a. Operationalizing the 
conditions that AG should bring to an EGC to the point that each condition was represented by a 
thematic code for effective use in content analysis was challenging. This is not to say developing 
codes was challenging, so much as actually using them to produce findings that felt reliable and 
reproducible was challenging. Whether or not this was the best way to use the concepts 
contained within the AG framework to determine whether or not these four events were adaptive 
is unclear. However, this may be due mainly to how the complicated system of shared 
governance made tracking the impacts of the events on the EGC. Also, whether or not the AG 
framework was the best available tool for determining whether or not historic events were 
adaptive is difficult to determine.  
 Ideally, this study would have assessed the extent to which the current EGC of the 
international Flathead has adaptive potential. Unfortunately, there was not enough time for this 
analysis to occur. Nevertheless, the answer to the question may not be terribly hard to determine. 
The Flathead Basin Commission was de-funded this year by the Montana Legislature and the 
future of the group is unclear (Ouellet 2018). For obvious reasons, this would be devastating to 
sustaining monitoring efforts of the international Flathead system. This would also severely 
reduce the potential for analytic deliberation amongst the institutions currently involved in the 
international Flathead EGC. Another interesting point brought up by one of the experts that I 
spoke with is that, since signing the MOU with Montana in 2010, BC has reached out to Alaska, 
Washington, and Idaho to negotiate and sign similar deals (Pers. Comm. Expert #7, 2018). My 
interview subject argued that the reasoning behind this was that BC wanted their future 
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negotiations with the other US states that the province borders to be more on their terms than 
was the 2010 MOU with Montana. My subject notes that those involved in the negotiations with 
BC in the run-up to the signing of the 2010 MOU failed to include bans on other extractive 
practices, such as logging, in the final language. My interview subject’s worry is that BC also 
pursued MOUs with the other US states they border so as to ensure that they would not have to 
concede as many extractive rights in future negotiations similar to the BC-MT MOU. If this is 
the case, BC may not be as dedicated to the future health of the international Flathead River 
ecosystem as the 2010 MOU indicated. Taken together, the uncertain future of the FBC and BC 
still supporting resource extraction in the basin where possible indicate that governance of the 
international Flathead is not in an adaptive state. This conclusion brings to mind those made by 
Cosens (2010) in her analysis of the Columbia River Treaty. Cosens (2010) found that successful 
environmental governance of the Columbia River social-ecological system hinged on there being 
a mixture of empowered local actors and infrastructure, oversight, and support provided by state 
and federal agencies. The potential loss of the FBC would represent a massive blow to the 
infrastructure, oversight, and support offered by the MT government to local actors dedicated to 
protecting the international Flathead.  
In conclusion, this study made theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions to 
the literature. Theoretically, this was a grounded study in environmental governance literature 
and tested a framework put forth by leading researchers. The structure of the study built upon 
and extended both theory and our understanding of these topics. Methodologically, this study 
traced out a river’s history and institutional experiences to piece together an example of dynamic 
transboundary river governance. The methodological choices sought to capture both US and 
Canadian perspectives. The data collection efforts were grounded in the context of the basin. 
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Empirically, this study documented governance history of the international Flathead in a 
systematic way. This approach differs from other works that have been done on this topic by 
adopting the lens of adaptive governance. Combined, these contributions add this case study of 
the international Flathead to the body of transboundary river governance literature.  
Discussion 
 
The process of conducting the research for this study has left me with a series of thoughts 
about the efficacy of AG as a historic metric as well as the potential of AG as a tool for 
improving future environmental governance. The complexities of environmental governance 
today, as well as the threat of increasing complexity in the future, make AG an exciting theory to 
consider. Though I partially understood coming into this study how nuanced environmental 
governance of complex natural resources is, my research efforts showed me that I had much to 
learn. There are more inputs that factor into the environmental governance of a single natural 
resource or system at any one time, be they social movements, laws, cultural norms, election 
results or other influences, than can be clearly understood. All of these inputs are both impacted 
by and impact each other. Untangling how this process, which eventually impacts environmental 
governance outcomes, happens is a challenging task. AG emerges as a response to this increasing 
complexity from a body of literature that seeks to confront complexity in social-ecological 
systems functionality. My work on this study showed me that there are some areas in which the 
promise of AG may hold up and others where it may not.  
 I find AG to be enticing as a concept because it offers a consistent way to view the 
actions of people, i.e. the most basic level of actors in environmental governance, in relation to 
environmental decision-making over time. Understanding the motivations behind environmental 
decision-making over time is key to improving future environmental outcomes. In this study, this 
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long-term level of analysis seemed to be where the AG framework was most productive. 
Viewing the ebbs and flows of political initiative, public support, and E-NGO campaigns 
through the lens of AG brought to life the concept of evolutionary, or non-evolutionary, 
environmental governance. For instance, viewing the increasingly important role of scientific 
research in applying pressure on mining advocates over the course of the 40 years from the 
perspective of that shifting role being a series of adaptations to changing EGCs felt productive. 
On the other hand, looking at the BC-LUPPs around the turn of the century from the AG 
perspective did not feel as productive. The impact of sudden changes resulting from elections 
and changing political goals seemed to not fit well into the analysis of the AG framework. These 
two examples may offer lessons for both how to use AG as a measure of historic trends and how 
to use it as a tool for modern natural resource decision makers.  
 The results of my AG findings show that those with the capacity to think in the long-
term, i.e. researchers working with significant historic time frames or E-NGO staff committed to 
a cause for years and years, may most effectively use the AG framework. This finding stems 
from the results of my research, which showed how the role of E-NGO’s and scientific research 
evolved in response to shifting demands over the course of the 40-year timeline. For instance, the 
emergence, as well as early actions, of the Flathead Coalition in the 1970’s marked a starting 
point for the dynamic and vital role that E-NGO river advocates would come to play over the 
following 40 years. With each passing decade, new and growing numbers of E-NGO’s formed 
other coalitions or ran novel and creative campaigns that increased awareness and maintained 
pressure on government forces to act to conserve. Eventually, the work of the transboundary 
Flathead Wild team in the 2000’s proved crucial to building the political pressure that helped 
lead to the signing of the MOU. In many ways, the manner in which the E-NGO’s functioned 
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over the 40 years may have constituted adaptations to the shifting EGCs. Further research should 
approach this topic more explicitly.  
 Another area where the findings of this study may show that AG is an effective tool is 
within analysis of the scientific networks that emerged and helped generate vital research data on 
the international Flathead. Over the full 40-year timeline, researchers from numerous US and 
Canadian organizations, from the Flathead Biological Station to BC Ministry of Sustainable 
Resource Management, all contributed to a growing body of data on the international Flathead. 
From the beginning of the 40-year timeline discussed in this study there was an investment in 
good information. This information proved durable over the years and was key to preventing 
proposed mining operations multiple times. This body of data, which became increasingly 
focused and reliable over the decades, was key to building strong pro-conservation arguments. 
The way the network of scientists that did this work changed over time, from local to 
transboundary to supra-national, may also constitute a series of adaptations to shifting EGCs. 
This important topic also calls for future research to more clearly determine the role that 
adaptation may have played in this network development. This future work on the role of E-
NGO and scientific networks could be best accomplished by approaching each of networks as its 
own sub-EGC. Approaches similar to the one used in this study, where the relevant actors are 
established and tracked over time, could prove productive. This approach would also benefit 
from integration of methodologies from literature on the role of institutional networks in AG. 
Finally, the emergence and growth of these networks clearly related to the building of social 
capital amongst publics involved in this timeline. There also seems to be connections between 
the growth of social capital and the willingness of involved politicians, scientists, and E-NGOs to 
push for river conservation measures. Better understanding the connections between these 
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networks and environmental governance outcomes would also be a good direction for future 
research on this area.  
 In terms of how the AG framework used herein could be utilized as a prescriptive tool for 
improving environmental governance, my findings indicate mixed potential. The ambiguities that 
exist in the definitions of the criteria and concepts that make up the framework are not ideal if 
the framework is to be used to inform significant decision-making processes. Work needs to be 
done to better operationalize the criteria and concepts through a peer-reviewed process before the 
framework should be used by those involved in resource decision-making processes. Clearer 
definitions of criteria and concepts as well as more trustworthy methods for determining whether 
or not real-world circumstances fulfill or meet the criteria and concepts are needed. Also needed 
is greater discussion of what conclusions can be drawn from an event only meeting some of the 
criteria or concepts. For instance, is an event that meets four of the five criteria adaptive? This 
added clarity could begin to make use of the framework an approachable task for an actor 
involved in environmental governance to determine how to achieve more adaptive governance 
outcomes. Due to the abstract nature of this type of analysis, the newness of the approach, and 
the extended periods of time between governance outcomes and impacts felt/seen as a result of 
governance outcomes use of the AG framework is not well suited to work on day-to-day 
administration and management of natural resources. Instead, the framework might prove to be 
most useful to E-NGOs involved in long-term work to achieve certain conservation goals. These 
actors often have access to information and governance processes while also having much 
greater flexibility to respond to change than other, more formal, actors. This potential was 
embodied by the work that Flathead Wild was able to do over the final 15 years of the timeline. 
Whereas certain actors, i.e. the Montana or BC governments, were largely stuck in their ways 
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and dedicated to single outcomes, FW was able to pursue numerous diverse options to achieve 
their desired outcomes. The importance of determining the potential role of actors to work to 
transition to AG is supported by Chaffin et al. (2016). The authors conclude that there is a void 
in environmental governance research on the question of when and how transitions to AG should 
be initiated. Though my research does not directly work to fill this void, my findings show that 
E-NGO actors may be especially well positioned to initiate the transition to AG.  
 Crucially though, there are still questions as to whether or not AG is the best concept to 
improve future environmental governance outcomes. For instance, in the mid-2000’s would FW 
have benefited from viewing their efforts as attempts to increase the likelihood of adaptive 
outcomes in the EGC? The answer is unclear. If analysis using the AG framework could have 
pointed the coalition of E-NGOs in a certain direction, then maybe it would have been effective. 
Still, until there is a clearer distinction between the functions of an EGC that is constantly 
evolving in response to environmental change and successful, collaborative, multi-jurisdictional 
environmental governance that may or may not explicitly be achieving outcomes that constitute 
adaptations, the answer is probably that AG is still best used as a tool for academic research. In 
other words, the events described in this study that were deemed adaptive or close to adaptive 
were also the events that, from a non-AG perspective, could have been deemed the most 
successful. Did the AG lens add anything to the analysis? My results point to yes because the 
criteria and concepts underlying the AG framework are well designed to shed meaning on the 
complex functions of environmental governance. Still, more work needs to be done to determine 
the extent to which referring to and understanding a successful environmental governance 
outcome as adaptive offers greater utility than referring to it as collaborative or equitable.  
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Future Research Directions 
	
 Several other areas for future research were noted. These include the idea of catalyst, or 
bridging, institutions, which are single institutions that, through their intentional design, may be 
able to bridge many gaps in an EGC. Legislating or mandating the creation of these institutions 
could help an EGC build towards adaptive potential. Next, the role of private funding in shifting 
international Flathead environmental governance outcomes over the course of the 40 year 
timeline was unexplored. Several research subjects mentioned that private funding began to 
support river advocacy work of a series of E-NGO’s around the turn of the century (Pers. Comm. 
Experts #6 and #8, 2018). This funding seems to have significantly increased the capacity of 
those organizations to make change. Unfortunately, finding any information on how this process 
worked proved difficult. Finally, I would have liked to have better explored the concept of there 
being a tipping point when public support for the protection of an area becomes easier due to the 
public slowly growing to view that place as one that “we protect” (Pers. Comm. Expert #1, 
2018). This idea was brought up by an interview subject in reference to their efforts to make the 
international Flathead such a place. Better understanding how this works as well as whether or 
not the process can be sped up could be interesting research topics with implications for this 
context and others.  
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Evolution of Governance of the Flathead of the Flathead River 
Interview Guide! 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. These interviews are part of the 
research for my thesis on the evolution of governance of the Flathead of the Flathead River. 
Specifically, I am interested in the shifting shape of Flathead governance in response to the threat 
of coal mining in the Canadian Flathead basin over the last 50 years. 
These interviews serve to reinforce my findings from review of textual sources on this 
history. I am striving to identify the 4-6 most influential events over this period of time. Once 
identified, I will work to deconstruct those events in an effort to better understand how each 
instance progressed as it did. 
These interviews will support that effort by providing me with varied perspectives on the 
historical timeline. I am interested in learning what you think were the most important events or 
processes in the effort to prevent coal mining in the Canadian Flathead basin, how they 
happened, and who was involved. These interviews will also hopefully help reveal previously 
undiscovered data sources or unexplored themes and confirm or deny my own preliminary 
findings on these matters. 
Before we get started, I want to let you know that your identity as a participant in this study will 
remain confidential if you so please. If so, your name will not be used in any presentations or 
written reports. I would like to tape record the interview. Taping ensures that your views are 
accurately recorded, and it allows me to focus on what you are saying. Is that OK with you? 
Terms. First, I would like to define some key terms and ideas so that we are on the same page. 
• Governance - "the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors 
involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction 
of social norms and institutions” (Huffy, 2011). 
• North Fork of the Flathead River vs. Flathead River- depending on which side of the 
border you are on, the name is different. I will strive to use the one that you are used to 
but I use them interchangeably occasionally, as well.   
• Resource Extraction – though this time period saw extensive efforts to develop resource 
extraction operations on both sides of the border, I would like to focus exclusively on the 
repeated attempts at coal mining in the headwaters of the NF/Flathead River on the 
Canadian side of the border between 1974 and 2014.  
Personal History and Participation. Let’s start with your involvement in the Flathead. 
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• How familiar are you with the history of the efforts to prevent coal mining in the 
Canadian Flathead? 
• Is that knowledge from direct experience?  
o If so, in what capacity did you gain that experience? 
Early History. Now, I would like to move into the early history of the Flathead coal mining 
saga.  
• Though the threat of mining has been present in the transboundary Flathead basin since 
white settlement, I am choosing to zoom in on what I consider to be the modern Canadian 
coal mining threat. My initial research shows that the US and Canadian public first 
learned of the existence of serious efforts to conduct large-scale coal mining operations in 
the Canadian Flathead basin in 1974. For this reason, I am using this year as my starting 
point for historical analysis. Is this where you would start the analysis? Why or why not? 
Moving Forward. From there, moving forward, I am interested in your personal timeline of this 
saga up to present day.  
• Where would you next take the story? 
o (If prompting needed) I often track the story through the timeline of significant 
scientific studies done on the environmental conditions of the transboundary 
Flathead. The Upper Flathead River Basin Study was a direct result of this early 
attention on the coal mining issue. That study helped spawn the massive Flathead 
River EIS, which seemed to really get the ball rolling. How do you track the 
timeline of significant events? 
• How were different generations of advocates able to maintain, or regain, momentum in 
the fight against coal mining? 
o What were the biggest hurdles to this? How did they overcome these hurdles?  
• How did the relationships between the governments involved and the E-NGO’s and 
stakeholder groups’ change over time? 
o Did this benefit the work against mining? 
Broader Topics. To begin wrapping up. 
• (Unless already explicitly stated) So many things have happened that have shaped this 
story, what do you think are the 4-6 most important points in this saga? 
o Who were the key players? What instruments, i.e. laws, treaties, enabling 
legislation, did they use? How did the placement and structure of the actors 
enable progress? 
• Do you think the passage of the NFPA is a good “end” to the timeline? 
o If not, would you take it up to present day? 
• Is there anything else you would like to add or anyone else you think I should talk to? 
